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VI 
PARTIES 
The parties to this appeal are those indicated in the caption, with the 
exception of defendants Kenneth W. Winger and Paul R. Humphreys. Winger and 
Humphreys are not parties to the appeal because neither responded to the original 
complaint or filed a motion to dismiss. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Plaintiffs seek review of the trial court's dismissal of their complaint for 
lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendants, which was certified by the trial court as a 
final judgment. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)0) (2002). 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue in this appeal is whether the trial court properly dismissed the 
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over a defendant alleged to have been a control person 
of a company in violation of Utah's securities laws and thereby liable for the company's 
alleged violations, when it is undisputed that he had no personal contacts with Utah. 
"
4[T]he propriety of a motion to dismiss is a question of law, [which this Court] 
review[s] for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court."9 
Wagner v.Clifton. 2002 UT 109, % 8, 62 P.3d 440 (citation omitted). 
1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The following are constitutional and statutory provisions "whose 
interpretation^] [are] determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal." 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(6). The text of these provisions is set forth in Addendum A of 
this brief 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 61 -1 -22(4) (2000) 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-26(8)(a) (2000) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings Below 
This is an appeal from an order of dismissal for lack of personal 
jurisdiction over the defendants. (R. 517, 552-59) Plaintiffs are institutional investors 
domiciled in various East Coast states. (R. 21) Defendant Michael J. Bragagnolo is a 
non-Utah resident alleged to have been "among the top officers of Safety-Kleen." (R. 
18-20, 313) Safety-Kleen is a Delaware corporation with its executive offices in South 
Carolina. (R. 21) 
Plaintiffs purchased bonds issued by Tooele County, Utah and secured by 
a loan agreement between the county and Saftey-Kleen. (R. 22) Plaintiffs later filed a 
complaint against Defendants, alleging as to Bragagnolo claims for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and violations of Utah's securities laws, all in connection with the 
county's issuance of the bonds. (R. 2-10, 23) Defendants moved for dismissal of the 
complaint, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over them. (R. 41, 98, 181, 
312) The trial court granted the motions and certified the dismissal as a final judgment. 
(R. 517, 555) Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. 552-59) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 1, 1997, Tooele County issued bonds to fund a hazardous waste 
incineration facility. (R. 22) These bonds were initially issued by the county "in book-
entry form" to The Depository Trust Company located in New York. (R. 645, 648, 650-
51)1 Plaintiffs purchased their respective interests in the bonds through The Depository 
Trust Company's book-entry system in New York. (R. 22, 645, 648, 650-51) The 
bonds were secured by a loan agreement between Tooele County and Safety-Kleen, a 
Deleware corporation with its executive offices in South Carolina.2 (R. 21-22) 
1
 These record citations are to pages of the Preliminary Offering Memorandum 
issued in conjunction with issuance of the bonds. Although that document contains text 
on either side of its pages, only one side of each page has been given a record number. 
The document also appears to have been placed in the record so as to read back to front 
rather than front to back. For the sake of consistency in citation, Bragagnolo refers in 
this brief to the pages as numbered in the record, but notes the above to aid the Court. 
2
 The current Safety-Kleen was formed through a series of mergers and 
transactions between Laidlaw Inc., LES, and the former Safety-Kleen Corporation. (R. 
20) The merger creating the current Safety-Kleen was not completed until 1998, (id.) 
and the loan agreement giving rise to this case was originally between the county and 
LES. (R. 643) However, in this brief, Bragagnolo refers only to Safety-Kleen because 
LES assumed the Safety-Kleen name (R. 20) and because further details of the corporate 
3 
The offering memorandum Plaintiffs relied on when they decided to invest 
in the bonds contained Safety-Kleen's financial reports for 1997. (R. 11-12) After 
Plaintiffs invested in the bonds, Safety-Kleen announced that it had discovered 
"accounting irregularities" in its financial reports for 1997. (R. 17) Subsequently, 
Saftey-Kleen defaulted on the bonds and filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. (R. 11) 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Utah District Court, alleging that Defendants 
were officers and directors of Safety-Kleen and directly responsible for the 
misstatements in the company's 1997 financial statements. (R. 2-20, 23) As to 
Bragagnolo, Plaintiffs alleged: "[He] served at all relevant times as a Director, 
Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Safety-Kleen. Prior to the 
Merger, Bragagnolo held senior executive positions with LES. Bragagnolo served as a 
Director of Safety-Kleen . . . and he served as [Chief Operating Officer.]" (R. 19) 
Additionally, Plaintiffs alleged that Bragagnolo "substantively participated in the sale of 
[the] Bonds"; (R. 10) was "personally responsible for" the financial statements relied on 
by Plaintiffs; (R. 8) knew of facts that made the "financial statements false and 
misleading"; (R. 9) and had the power to influence or prevent the statements' issuance 
(R. 8). (See generally R. 3-10) Plaintiffs' brought claims against Bragagnolo for fraud, 
negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act, Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (2000), et seq. (R. 3-10) The record does not indicate that Plaintiffs 
history are not relevant to the issue presented. 
4 
relied on Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-26(8)(a) (2000)'s substitute service provision to serve 
Defendants with copies of the complaint and summons. 
Bragagnolo filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the trial court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over him. (R. 310-12) In support of that motion, Bragagnolo filed 
an affidavit, wherein he stated: "I am not now, nor have I ever been, a resident of the 
state of Utah." (R. 313) In another affidavit, he stated: 
4. I have never been a director of either Safety-Kleen or 
Laidlaw Environmental Services. 
5. In my position at Safety-Kleen and Laidlaw 
Environmental Services, I did not have any 
management oversight or control over the accounting 
department. 
6. I did not participate in the preparation of any of the 
financial statements, financial reports, or other 
financial documents alleged by plaintiffs to contain 
untrue statements or to omit material facts, nor did I 
participate in the preparation of the offering 
memorandum, registration statement, or other SEC 
reports or filings referred to by plaintiffs in their 
complaint. 
7. I was not responsible for any of the documents 
described in the preceding paragraph; did not sign any 
of those documents; and did not see any of them 
before they were made public. 
8. I did not participate in the marketing or sale of the 
bonds complained of in this action; never discussed 
the sale or purchase of those bonds with any potential 
buyer; and did not make, authorize, or approve any 
5 
representations made in connection with the sale of 
those bonds. 
9. I have not been to Utah for any reason since leaving 
Safety Kleen. (R. 435) 
Based on the pleadings and Bragagnolo's affidavits, the trial court granted 
his motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (R. 517) It later certified that 
dismissal as a final judgment, (R. 555) and Plaintiffs timely appealed. (R. 552-59) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and submits an 
affidavit contesting the plaintiffs allegations relative to jurisdiction, and the plaintiff 
relies solely upon the unverified allegations in his or her complaint to respond to the 
motion to dismiss, then the facts stated in the defendant's affidavit are taken as true. In 
this case, Bragagnolo moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and submitted an 
affidavit contesting the allegations of the complaint that Plaintiffs rely on for their 
assertion of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs did not respond to Bragagnolo's affidavit. 
Consequently, Bragagnolo's affidavit establishes that he had no minimum contacts with 
Utah. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of the claims against 
Bragagnolo for lack of jurisdiction over him. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on section 61-1-22(4) as a basis for jurisdiction runs 
counter to the requirements of due process. Section 61-1-22(4) imposes liability upon 
6 
directors of companies in violation of Utah's securities laws. It also imposes a burden 
on a defendant shown to be a control person of a company to prove his lack of 
knowledge of the company's misconduct in order to avoid personal liability. Although 
this section speaks to director liability, it does not provide a basis for jurisdiction. 
Liability and jurisdiction are separate and distinct legal concepts. Liability turns on the 
relationship between the parties; whereas jurisdiction turns on the relationship between 
the defendant and the forum state. Furthermore, jurisdiction as to each defendant must 
be demonstrated separately. To base jurisdiction on section 61-1-22(4) would allow 
allegations of an individual's joint liability with a company with minimum Utah 
contacts to suffice as a demonstration of minimum contacts as to the individual 
defendant. Not only would such a result run counter to due process, but the courts that 
have addressed this argument have rejected it. This Court should do likewise. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on section 61-l-26(8)(a) as a basis for jurisdiction is 
also misplaced. Section 61-l-26(8)(a) is a substitute service statute. It provides an 
alternative means for serving process on an out-of-state defendant. Not only is the 
record silent as to whether Plaintiffs used this alternative means for serving process on 
Bragagnolo, but the substitute service statute does not serve as a basis for jurisdiction 
over him in any event. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
BRAGAGNOLO'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
A. Due process requires a showing that Bragagnolo has minimum 
contacts with Utah before a Utah court can properly exercise 
jurisdiction over him. 
This Court considers two factors in determining whether Utah courts have 
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: "First, the court must assess whether Utah 
law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. . . . Second, assuming 
Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the court must 
assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with the due process requirements 
of the Fourteenth Amendment." In re W.A.. 2002 UT 127, ^  14, 63 P.3d 607 (emphasis 
omitted).3 "[This Court] frequently make[s] [the] due process analysis first[, however,] 
because any set of circumstances that satisfies due process will also satisfy the long-arm 
statute." SH Megadiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp.. 969 P.2d 430, 433 
(Utah 1998). 
"Due process requires that before a court can exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant, the nonresident defendant's contacts with Utah must be 
3
 Prior to In re W.A., this Court had "applied various tests in determining whether 
personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant." 2002 UT 127 at^ f 11. In In 
re W.A., however, the Court "clarified] the law regarding this issue" and outlined the 
two-part test cited above. IcL at ^ 14. 
8 
'such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.'"" Radcliffe v. Akhavan. 875 P.2d 608, 612 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) fguoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington. 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 
158 (1945)) (additional citation omitted). Plaintiffs must, therefore, show that 
Bragagnolo "purposefully established minimum contacts within Utah, the forum state, 
such that [he] could reasonably anticipate being haled into court here," in order to satisfy 
the due process prerequisite to Utah's exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Id. 
Plaintiffs have failed to make this showing. 
B. Plaintiffs' allegations of Bragagnolo's joint liability are insufficient 
alone to demonstrate that he has minimum contacts with Utah given 
his affidavit testimony contesting those allegations. 
Plaintiffs' argument that Bragagnolo has sufficient minimum contacts for a 
Utah court to properly exercise jurisdiction over him relies on two sets of allegations: 
(1) those alleging that Safety-Kleen has sufficient minimum contacts with Utah relative 
to issuance of the bonds to support a Utah court's exercise of jurisdiction over it; and 
(2) those alleging that Bragagnolo acted as a control person of Safety-Kleen and had 
knowledge of, or control over, its issuance of the bonds and thus also has minimum 
contacts with Utah. (Br. of Appellants at 18) 
Plaintiffs' allegations of Bragagnolo's status relative to Safety-Kleen are 
therefore essential to their jurisdictional claim. In practical terms, this means that 
whether Bragagnolo was a control person with knowledge of Safety-Kleen's 
9 
wrongdoing is determinative of both Utah jurisdiction over Bragagnolo and 
Bragagnolo's liability. This Court has already udecide[d] how to proceed when 
jurisdiction turns on the same facts as the merits of the case." Anderson v. Am. Soc'v of 
Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons. 807 P.2d 825, 826 (Utah 1990). 
The approach taken by [this Court in such 
circumstances] is motivated by concern for flexibility, 
judicial economy, and preservation of substantial 
rights. In [the trial court's] discretion, . . . it may 
determine jurisdiction on affidavits alone, permit 
discovery, or hold an evidentiary hearing. If it 
proceeds on documentary evidence alone (i.e., the first 
two methods), the plaintiff is only required to make a 
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. The 
plaintiffs factual allegations are accepted as true 
unless specifically controverted by the defendant's 
affidavits or by depositions, but any disputes in the 
documentary evidence are resolved in the plaintiffs 
favor. 
Id. (emphasis added). More specifically, when a plaintiff "reliefs] on facts alleged in his 
unverified complaint for his assertion of jurisdiction" and the defendant responds with 
an "affidavit setting forth its version of the jurisdictional facts," on appeal, "the facts 
asserted in the affidavit are taken as true and the facts recited in the complaint are 
considered only to the extent that they do not contradict the affidavit." Arguello v. 
Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co.. 838 P.2d 1120. 1121 (Utah 1992): see also Roskellev 
& Co. v. Lerco. Inc.. 610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 1980) ("when jurisdiction is 
challenged, plaintiff cannot solely rely on allegations of jurisdiction in its complaint in 
10 
the face of an affidavit by defendant which specifically contradicts those general 
allegations"). 
In this case, the allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint relevant to whether 
Bragagnolo has minimum contacts with Utah by virtue of being a control person of 
Safety-Kleen are as follows: "[He] served at all relevant times as a Director, Executive 
Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Safety-Kleen. Prior to the Merger, 
Bragagnolo held senior executive positions with LES. Bragagnolo served as a Director 
of Safety-Kleen . . . and he served as [Chief Operating Officer.]" (R. 19) Additionally, 
Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Bragagnolo "substantively participated in the sale of [the] 
Bonds"; (R. 10) was "personally responsible for" the financial statements relied on by 
Plaintiffs; (R. 8) knew of facts that made the "financial statements false and misleading"; 
(R. 9) and had the power to influence or prevent the statements' issuance (R. 8). (See 
generally 3-10) 
Bragagnolo squarely contested these allegations by affidavit testimony: 
4. I have never been a director of either Safety-Kleen or 
Laidlaw Environmental Services. 
5. In my position at Safety-Kleen and Laidlaw 
Environmental Services, I did not have any 
management oversight or control over the accounting 
department. 
6. I did not participate in the preparation of any of the 
financial statements, financial reports, or other 
financial documents alleged by plaintiffs to contain 
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untrue statements or to omit material facts, nor did I 
participate in the preparation of the offering 
memorandum, registration statement, or other SEC 
reports or filings referred to by plaintiffs in their 
complaint. 
7. I was not responsible for any of the documents 
described in the preceding paragraph; did not sign any 
of those documents; and did not see any of them 
before they were made public. 
8. I did not participate in the marketing or sale of the 
bonds complained of in this action; never discussed 
the sale or purchase of those bonds with any potential 
buyer; and did not make, authorize, or approve any 
representations made in connection with the sale of 
those bonds. 
9. I have not been to Utah for any reason since leaving 
Safety Kleen. (R. 435) 
He also gave affidavit testimony stating: "I am not now, nor have I ever been, a resident 
of the state of Utah." (R. 313) 
Plaintiffs failed to offer affidavits or other evidence countering 
Bragagnolo's affidavits. Therefore, this Court takes "the facts asserted in 
[Bragagnolo's] affidavits] . . . as true." Arguello, 838 P.2d 1120. Because Plaintiffs' 
jurisdictional theory depends on Bragagnolo being a director of Safety-Kleen with 
knowledge and/or control of that company's alleged wrongdoing, and because the facts 
of Bragagnolo's affidavit completely undermine that theory, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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C. Plaintiffs' jurisdictional argument based on Utah Code Ann. §61-1-
22(4) (2000) runs counter to due process by confusing jurisdiction 
with liability and by circumventing the jurisdictional requirement 
that each defendant be shown to have minimum contacts with the 
forum state. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Plaintiffs contend that Bragagnolo must 
wait until trial, and there disprove his liability, in order to defeat jurisdiction. (Br. of 
Appellants at 18) Plaintiffs base their argument on Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) 
(2000), (Br. of Appellants at 19-21) which makes "a partner, an officer, a director, a 
person of similar status or function, or a seller of securities [of an entity in violation of 
section 61-1-1] . . . liable for violations committed by the entity unless that person 
proves the affirmative defense that he lacked knowledge of the unlawful acts." 
Steenblik v. Lichfield. 906 P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995).4 Plaintiffs insist that these bald 
allegations of liability under section 61-1-22(4) are a basis for jurisdiction. This is 
simply not the case. 
4
 Section 61-1-22(4) states in full: 
[E]very partner, officer, or director of [a company in 
violation of section 61-1-1, as Safety-Kleen is alleged to be], 
every person occupying a similar status or performing similar 
functions, [and] every employee of such a seller or buyer [of 
securities] who materially aids in the sale or purchase . . . [of 
those securities is] also liable jointly and severally with and 
to the same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless the 
nonseller or nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of the 
facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) (2000). 
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As the Ninth Circuit explained in an analogous context: "Liability and 
jurisdiction are independent. Liability depends on the relationship between the plaintiff 
and the defendants and between the individual defendants; jurisdiction depends only 
upon each defendant's relationship with the forum. Regardless of their joint liability, 
jurisdiction over each defendant must be established individually." Sher v. Johnson. 911 
F.2d 1357, 1365 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (analyzing whether "jurisdiction over 
the partnership establishes jurisdiction over the partners" when "the liability of the 
partnership would establish the joint and several liability of each individual partner"). 
Indeed, "liability is not to be conflated with amenability to suit in a particular forum." 
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert. 94 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 
1996) (holding that although a statute may make a parent company liable for its 
subsidiary's tort in a particular state, that state is precluded from exercising jurisdiction 
over the parent company absent a showing of minimum contacts between the parent 
company and the state). 
Case law authoritative to this jurisdiction accords with the two key 
principles articulated by the Ninth Circuit: (1) jurisdiction turns on the defendant's 
relationship with the forum and not on whether a theory of liability has been plead; and 
(2) regardless of potential joint liability, "jurisdiction over each defendant must be 
established individually." Sher. 911 F.2d at 1365. As to the first principle, this Court 
has also held that the "[Relationship between the defendants and the forum" is 
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dispositive of the minimum contacts inquiry. Rhoades v. Wright, 622 P.2d 343,346 
(Utah 1980): accord Mallorv Eng'g v. Ted R. Brown & Assoc, 618 P.2d 1004, 1007-08 
(Utah 1980): see also Harnischfeger Engineers, Inc. v. Uniflo Conveyor, Inc.. 883 F. 
Supp. 608, 614-15 (D. Utah 1995). As to the second principle, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that "[t]he requirements of International Shoe . . . must be met 
as to each defendant over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction." Rush v. Savchuk, 
444 U.S. 320, 332, 100 S. Ct. 571, 579 (1980). 
These two principles evidence that "[pjersonal jurisdiction has 
constitutional dimensions." Am. Tel. & Tel., 94 F.3d at 591. Indeed, "the due process 
clause [is] the source of protection for non-resident defendants," id, from being haled 
into court in a state with which they have "no contacts, ties, or relations." Mallorv, 618 
P.2d at 1007. Plaintiffs assert that by pleading a prima facie case of Defendants' joint 
liability with Safety-Kleen under section 61-1-22(4) they have established jurisdiction 
over each Defendant in Utah. This argument runs squarely counter to the protections of 
due process, which require that jurisdiction depend not on liability, and that jurisdiction 
be demonstrated for each defendant individually. This Court should, therefore, reject 
Plaintiffs' section 61-1-22(4) argument as violative of due process and affirm the trial 
court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.5 
5
 Plaintiffs emphasize the provision of section 61-1-22(4) that places the burden 
on a defendant to prove lack of knowledge of his company's wrongdoing once his status 
as a control person has been established. (Br. of Appellants at 22) This provision has no 
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D. Other courts that have addressed whether jurisdiction can be based 
on statutes analogous to section 61-1-22(4) have rejected the theory 
as violative of due process.6 
In Schlatter v. Mo-Comm Futures, Ltd., 662 P.2d 553 (Kan. 1983), the 
Kansas Supreme Court was presented with the same argument Plaintiffs make here 
based on section 61-1-22(4). The operative language of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) 
(Supp. 1982)7 is identical to that of Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) (2000). In Schlatter, it 
bearing on liability before trial, let alone on jurisdiction. The burden to prove lack of 
knowledge attaches only after prima facie evidence of a defendant's status as a control 
person has been offered at trial. See Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 877 (Utah 
1995) ("If it is established that the defendant functioned in or occupied one of these 
positions, [then] the defendant has the burden of proving that he did not know[.]" 
(emphasis added)). Plaintiffs have not "established" that Bragagnolo was a control 
person of Safety-Kleen. Therefore, as yet he bears no burden of disproving his 
knowledge of wrongdoing. Clearly, the provision likewise does not create a 
presumption of jurisdiction that can only be rebutted at trial. 
6
 In an unpublished decision, the California Court of Appeals considered the same 
jurisdictional arguments raised by Plaintiffs here in an appeal from a California case 
involving the same plaintiffs and defendants as this case. See Eaton Vance Dist., Inc. v. 
Grainger, No. C040158, 2003 WL 1521896 (Cal. Ct. App. March 25, 2003). The 
California court rejected Plaintiffs' arguments as well. The Eaton Vance opinion is 
attached at Appendix F. 
7
 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) (Supp. 1982) states: 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller 
liable under subsection (a), every partner, officer, or director 
(or person occupying a similar status or performing similar 
functions) or employee of such a seller who materially aids 
in the sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who materially 
aids in the sale is also liable jointly and severally with and to 
the same extent as the seller, unless the nonseller who is so 
liable sustains the burden of proof that such nonseller did not 
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have 
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was uncontested that the defendants were directors of a company that had violated 
Kansas's securities laws. Schlatter, 662 P.2d at 555-56. The defendants, however, 
moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as it was undisputed that they had no contacts 
with Kansas. IcL at 563. As here, despite their failure to dispute the defendant's lack of 
contacts with the state, the plaintiffs argued that Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1268(b) provided a 
basis for jurisdiction over the defendants. The Kansas court held that although the 
analogous Kansas statute provided a basis for the defendants' liability, it did not provide 
a basis for Kansas to assert jurisdiction over them: 
It is true that the statute establishes the basis for liability of 
persons involved in the sale of unregistered securities but it 
does not establish the jurisdiction of the court to submit such 
persons to liability. In the present case the court must first 
have in personam jurisdiction of [the defendants] before the 
statutory liability may be applied. Jurisdiction depends upon 
[the long-arm statute] and the constitutional guarantees of 
due process as previously discussed. 
Id. at 563. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Schlatter on the basis that it was uncontested 
in that case that the defendants had no minimum contacts with the state. However, by 
known, of the existence of the facts by reason of which the 
liability is alleged to exist. There is contribution as in cases 
of contract among the several persons so liable. 
Highlighting the language "every partner, officer, or director . . . who materially aids in 
the sale," id.. Plaintiffs claim that the Kansas statute "is materially different from the 
Utah statute in . . . its language." (Br. of Appellant's at 40) A simple reading of each 
statute shows that Plaintiffs are plainly mistaken. Section 61-1-22(4) also contains the 
language "every partner, officer, or director . . . who materially aids in the sale." Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-22(4) (2000). 
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failing to respond to Bragagnolo's affidavits in support of his motion to dismiss, 
Plaintiffs have likewise rendered his lack of minimum contacts with Utah an 
uncontested matter. .See Anderson v. Am. Soc'y of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 
807 P.2d 825, 826 (Utah 1990); Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 
1120, 1121 (Utah 1992); Roskellev & Co. v. Lerco. Inc., 610 P.2d 1307, 1310 (Utah 
1980). Schlatter is therefore materially indistinguishable from this case on this issue. 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia has also 
stated that 
to permit the exercise of jurisdiction based on no more than 
an allegation that the defendant controlled the entity which 
performed the act complained of.. . creates the very horrible 
. . . paraded: a lawsuit in any [jurisdiction] against a 
defendant, domiciled or doing business [anywhere] on the 
face of the earth, based on the purchase of [securities] and the 
mere allegation of control over the entity which performed 
the act complained of. 
In re Baan Co. Sec. Litis.. 81 F. Supp. 2d 75, 82 (D.D.C. 2000). Thus, as the Schlatter 
court explained, a plaintiff must demonstrate the forum court's jurisdiction over a 
defendant before any statutory liability may be applied. Furthermore, as the District of 
Columbia court stated, to allow jurisdiction on the basis of a joint liability statute would 
result in circumvention of the due process requirement to demonstrate the minimum 
contacts of each individual defendant. This Court should follow Kansas's and the 
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District of Columbia District Court's lead and reject the notion that section 61-1-22(4), 
creating a theory of liability, also establishes jurisdiction.8 
8
 The whole of Plaintiffs' brief confuses the issues of liability and jurisdiction. 
Thus, the majority of cases Plaintiffs cite from other jurisdictions in support of their 
argument based on section 61-1-22(4) address liability under statutes analogous to 61-1-
22(4), not whether those statutes act as a basis for jurisdiction. See Howard v. Everex 
Svs.. Inc.. 228 F.3d 1057, 1065 (9th Cir. 2000); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp.. 914 
F.2d 1564, 1575 (9th Cir. 1990); United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Haves. Inc.. 
463 P.2d 770, 775 (Cal. 1970); Kamen v. Lindlv. 94 Cal. App. 4th 197 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2001); Courtney v. Waring. 191 Cal. App. 3d 1434 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Neptune Soc. 
Corp. v. Longanecker. 194 Cal. App. 3d 1233 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Sherman v. Llovd. 
181 Cal. App. 3d 693 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Bowden v. Robinson. 67 Cal. App. 3d 705 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Eastwood v. Froehlich. 60 Cal. App. 3d 523 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); 
Boddv v. Theiling. 199 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Ga. Ct. App. 1973); Goelitz v. Lathrop. 3 
N.E.2d 305, 314 (111. App. Ct. 1936). 
The cases that Plaintiffs cite that do address jurisdictional issues in the 
context of statutes similar to section 61-1-22(4) are each distinguishable on their facts. 
The respective courts simply conclude that the plaintiffs met their burden of making a 
prima facie demonstration of minimum contacts-something Plaintiffs here failed to do 
when they did not respond to Bragagnolo's affidavits-and that therefore jurisdiction was 
proper. See San Mateo County Transit Dist. v. Dearman. Fitzgerald & Roberts. Inc.. 979 
F.2d 1356, 1357-58 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that jurisdiction over a defendant was 
proper after the plaintiff produced a letter and deposition testimony supporting exercise 
of jurisdiction); McNamara v. Bre-X Minerals Ltd.. 46 F. Supp. 2d 628 (E.D. Tex. 1999) 
(engaging in fact-intensive analysis of jurisdictional issues after submission of affidavits 
by all parties); Derensis v. Coopers & Lybrand Chartered Accountants. 930 F. Supp. 
1003, 1014 (D.N.J. 1996) (concluding jurisdiction existed over non-resident defendants 
where the plaintiffs made a prima facie showing that the defendants were "controlling 
persons" of the company and the defendants apparently conceded as much); Landry v. 
Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants. 715 F. Supp. 98, 100-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(addressing jurisdictional issues after submission of affidavits of third-party plaintiffs); 
Seagate Tech. V. A.J. Kogvo Co.. Ltd.. 219 Cal. App. 3d 696, 699-700, 704-06 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1990) (essentially concluding that, although the defendant submitted a 
"declaration" in support of his motion to dismiss as well as a letter referred to in his 
declaration, the facts in his declaration and related letter did not rebut the plaintiffs 
prima facie showing of jurisdiction). 
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E. Plaintiffs' argument based on Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-26(8)(a) 
(2000) misinterprets that statute as one creating a basis for 
jurisdiction without a showing of minimum contacts rather than as 
one providing merely an alternative means of serving process. 
Plaintiffs assert that "[sjection 61-1-26 of the Utah Code [also] grants Utah 
courts personal jurisdiction to enforce the securities laws." (Br. of Appellants at 36) 
They rely specifically upon subsection (8)(a) of section 61-1-26, which provides: 
When any person, including any nonresident of this state, 
engages in conduct prohibited or made actionable by this 
chapter or any rule or order hereunder, and he has not filed a 
consent to service of process under Subsection (7) and 
personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be obtained 
in this state, that conduct shall be considered equivalent to 
his appointment of the division or the director to be his 
attorney to receive service of any lawful process in any 
noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding against him or his 
successor executor or administrator which grows out of that 
conduct and which is brought under this chapter or any rule 
or order hereunder, with the same force and validity as if 
served on him personally. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-l-26(8)(a) (2000) (emphasis added). 
This is a substitute service statute. It provides a means for serving process 
on, and thus "acquiring jurisdiction" over, an out-of-state defendant who cannot 
otherwise be served. Piantes v. Hayden-Stone, Inc.. 30 Utah 2d 110, 514 P.2d 529, 530 
(Utah 1973) (emphasis added). It does not grant a basis for personal jurisdiction that 
would circumvent the minimum contacts requirement. Cf kL at 529-30 (addressing 
20 
whether the predecessor to section 61-126(8)(a) is "the exclusive method of acquiring 
jurisdiction" only after discussing the defendant's minimum contacts). 
Plaintiffs rely on two cases in support of their argument based on section 
61-l-26(8)(a). Neither is apposite. In the first case, Am. Microtel Inc. v. Secretary of 
State. 1995 WL 809575, 3 Mass. L. Rptr. 479 (Mass. Super. Ct), Plaintiffs argue that 
"Massachusetts . . . interpreted this same provision in a Massachusetts' statute . . . as 
extending jurisdiction over an individual who claimed that he had done no act and had 
engaged in no conduct within the jurisdiction of the state." (Br. of Appellants at 37-38) 
Microtel however, was a case in which, after taking evidence at an administrative 
hearing, the hearing officer found that the defendant controlled two companies in 
violation of Massachusetts securities law, and thus implicitly concluded that he had 
established minimum contacts with the state. See id. at *10. Jurisdiction having been 
demonstrated, the Microtel court therefore concluded that service of process under 
Massachusetts's analog to section 61-1-26 was a permissible means of acquiring 
jurisdiction in the administrative proceedings. See id. at **10-11. 
Plaintiffs also argue that "in Brown v. Inv. Management & Research. Inc., 
[475 S.E.2d 754 (S.C. 1996)], the South Carolina Supreme Court interpreted a statutory 
provision identical to Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-26(8) to mean that violations of that 
state's securities provisions 'as a matter of law . . . submitted [Appellees] to personal 
jurisdiction in South Carolina.' WL at [757]." (Br. of Appellants at 38) Plaintiffs 
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quotation of Brown is misleading. The South Carolina court actually "[held] as a matter 
of law that in selling securities in this state. Respondents submitted to personal 
jurisdiction in South Carolina." IcL (emphasis added). The Brown court held that the 
defendants actually sold securities in South Carolina. Therefore, the court first 
concluded that the respondents had established minimum contacts with South Carolina 
and then applied their analog to section 61-l-26(8)(a) simply to acquire jurisdiction over 
those respondents. 
The record is silent as to whether Plaintiffs used section 61-l-26(8)(a)'s 
alternative means for serving process on Bragagnolo, and at any rate, section 61-1-
26(8)(a) clearly is not intended as a basis for jurisdiction. If all that were required as a 
basis for jurisdiction was for plaintiffs to serve process, the minimum contacts 
requirement would be rendered meaningless. Section 61-l-26(8)(a) provides an 
alternate means of service on a non-resident defendant when a basis for jurisdiction over 
that defendant has already been demonstrated. Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that 
Bragagnolo established minimum contacts with Utah. Therefore, service of process on 
him, by whatever means, was ineffectual to confer personal jurisdiction over him in 
Utah. Accordingly, this Court should reject Plaintiffs' jurisdictional argument based on 
section 61-l-26(8)(a) and affirm the trial court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint as to Bragagnolo for lack of jurisdiction. 
DATED this M day of June, 2003. 
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ADDENDUM A 
CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the Unitec States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law, nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
61-1-22. Sales and purchases in violation — Remedies — 
Limitation of actions. 
(1) (a) A person who offers or sells a security in violation of Subsection 
61-1-3(1), Section 61-1-7, Subsection 61-1-17(2), any rule or order under 
Section 61-1-15, which requires the affirmative approval of sales literature 
before it is used, any condition imposed under Subsection 61-1-10(4) or 
61-1-11(7), or offers, sells, or purchases a security in violation of Subsec-
tion 61-1-1(2) is liable to the person selling the security to or buying the 
security from him, who may sue either at law or m equity to recover the 
consideration paid for the security, together with interest at 12% per year 
from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, less the 
amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the 
security or for damages if he no longer owns the security 
(b) Damages are the amount that would be recoverable upon a tender 
less the value of the security when the buyer disposed of it and interest at 
12% per year from the date of disposition 
(2) The court m a suit brought under Subsection (1) may award an amount 
equal to three times the consideration paid for the security, together with 
interest, costs, and attorney's fees, less any amounts, all as specified in 
Subsection (1) upon a showing that the violation was reckless or intentional 
(3) A person who offers or sells a security m violation of Subsection 61-1-1(2) 
is not liable under Subsection (l)(a) if the purchaser knew of the untruth or 
omission, or the seller did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could 
not have known of the untrue statement or misleading omission 
(4) (a) Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller or buyer 
liable under Subsection (1), every partner, officer, or director of such a 
seller or buyer, every person occupying a similar status or performing 
similar functions, every employee of such a seller or buyer who materially 
aids in the sale or purchase, and every broker-dealer or agent who 
materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with and to 
the same extent as the seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or 
nonpurchaser who is so hable sustains the burden of proof that he did not 
know, and in exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the 
existence of the facts by reason of which the liability is alleged to exist 
(b) There is contribution as in cases of contract among the several 
persons so liable 
(5) Any tender specified m this section may be made at any time before 
entry of judgment 
(6) A cause of action under this section survives the death of any person who 
might have been a plaintiff or defendant 
(7) (a) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability under this 
section unless brought before the expiration of four years after the act or 
transaction constituting the violation or the expiration of two years after 
the discovery by the plaintiff of the facts constituting the violation, 
whichever expires first 
61-1-22 cont 
(b) No person may sue under this section if 
(1) the buyer or seller received a written offer, before suit and at a 
time when he owned the security, to refund the consideration paid 
together with interest at 12% per year from the date of payment, less 
the amount of any income received on the security, and he failed to 
accept the offer within 30 days of its receipt, or 
(n) the buyer or seller received such an offer before suit and at a 
time when he did not own the security, unless he rejected the offer m 
writing within 30 days of its receipt 
(8) No person who has made or engaged m the performance of any contract 
m violation of this chapter or any rule or order hereunder, or who has acquired 
any purported right under any such contract with knowledge of the facts by 
reason of which its making or performance was in violation, may base any suit 
on the contract 
(9) 4 condition, stipulation or provision binding a person acquiring a 
security to waive compliance with this chapter or a rule or order hereunder is 
void 
(10) (a) The rights and i emedies provided by this chapter are m addition to 
any other rights or remedies that may exist at law or m equity 
(b) This chapter does not create any cause of action not specified in this 
section or Subsection 61-1-4(6) 
61-1-26- Scope of the act — Service of process. 
(1) Section 61-1-1, Subsection 61-1-3(1), Sections 61-1-7, 61-1-15 5, 61-1-17, 
and 61-1-22 apply to persons who sell or offer to sell when 
(a) an offer to sell is made in this state, or 
(b) an offer to buy is made and accepted in this state 
(2) Section 61-1-1, Subsection 61-1-3(1), and Section 61-1-17 apply to 
persons who buy or offer to buy when 
(a) an offer to buy is made in this state, or 
(b) an offer to sell is made and accepted in this state 
(3) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is made in this 
state whether or not either party is then present in this state, when the offer 
(a) originates from this state, or 
(b) is directed by the offeror to this state and received at the place to 
which it is directed, or at any post office in this state in the case of a mailed 
offer 
(4) For the purposes of this section, an offer to sell or to buy is accepted in 
this state when acceptance 
(a) is communicated to the offeror m this state, and 
(b) has not previously been communicated to the offeror, orally or m 
writing, outside this state, and acceptance is communicated to the offeror 
in this state, whether or not either party is then present in this state, 
when the offeree directs it to the offeror m this state reasonably believing 
the offeror to be m thi^ state and it is received at the place to which it is 
directed or at any post office in this state m the case of a mailed 
acceptance 
(5) An offer to sell or to buy is not made m this state when 
(a) the publisher circulates or there is circulated on his behalf in this 
state any bona fide newspaper or other publication of general, regular, and 
paid circulation which is not published m this state, or which is published 
in this state but has had more than % of its circulation outside this state 
during the past 12 months, or 
(b) a radio or television program originating outside this state is 
received in this state 
(6) Section 61-1-2 and Subsection 61-1-3(3), as well as Section 61-1-17 so far 
as investment advisers are concerned, apply when any act mstrumental in 
effecting prohibited conduct is done in this state, whether or not either party 
is then present m this state 
61-1-26 cont 
(7) (a) Every application for registration under this chapter and every 
issuer which proposes to offer a security in this state through any person 
acting on an agency basis m the common-law sense shall file with the 
division, m such form as it prescribes by rule, an irrevocable consent 
appointing the division or the director to be his attorney to receive service 
of any lawful process m any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding 
against him or his successor, executor, or administrator which arises 
under this chapter or any rule or order hereunder after the consent has 
been filed, with the same force and validity as if served personally on the 
person filing the consent 
(b) A person who has filed such a consent m connection with a previous 
registration or notice filing need not file another 
(c) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of 
the division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the 
division m a suit, action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the 
service and a copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant or 
respondent at his last address on file with the division, and the plaintiff's 
affidavit of compliance with this subsection is filed m the case on or before 
the return day of the process, if any, or within such further time as the 
court allows 
(8) (a) When any person, including any nonresident of this state, engages in 
conduct prohibited or made actionable by this chapter or any rule or order 
hereunder, and he has not filed a consent to service of process under 
Subsection (7) and personal jurisdiction over him cannot otherwise be 
obtained in this state, that conduct shall be considered equivalent to his 
appointment of the division or the director to be his attorney to receive 
service of any lawful process m any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding 
against him or his successor executor or administrator which grows out of 
that conduct and which is brought under this chapter or any rule or order 
hereunder, with the same force and validity as if served on him personally 
(b) Service may be made by leaving a copy of the process in the office of 
the division, but it is not effective unless the plaintiff, who may be the 
division m a suit, action, or proceeding instituted by it, sends notice of the 
service and a copy of the process by registered mail to the defendant or 
respondent at his last-known address or takes other steps which are 
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and the plaintiff's affidavit of 
compliance with this subsection is filed in the case on or before the return 
day of the process, if any, or within such further time as the court allows 
(9) When process is served under this section, the court, or the director shall 
order such continuance as may be necessary to afford the defendant or 
respondent reasonable opportunity to defend 
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555 Capitol Mall, Tenth Floor 
Sacramento, CA 958144686 
Telephone: (916)441-0131 
Facsimile: (916) 4414021 
Attorncys_for Defendant 
HENRY KTAYLOR 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MFS SERIES TRUST m (on behalf of MFS~ 
MUNICIPAL HIGH INCOME FUND), 
MERRILL LYNCH HIGH YIELD ' 
MUNICIPAL BOND FUND, INC., 
MUNTHOLDINGS FUND, INC., MERRILL 
LYNCH MUNICIPAL BOND FUND, THE 
NATIONAL PORTFOLIO, MERRILL 
LYNCH MUNICIPAL STRATEGY FUND, 
EATON VANCE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., 
T. ROWE PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC., 
JOHN HANCOCK FUNDS, INC., AND 
PUTNAME INVESTMENTS, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
— v. 
KENNETH W. WINGER, JOHN R. 
GRAINGER, JAMES R. BULLOCK, PAUL 
R HUMPHREYS, JOHN W. ROLLINS, 
SB., JOHN W. ROLLINS, JR., LESLIE W. 
HAWORTH, DAVID B, THOMAS, JR. 
HENRY B. TJPPIE, JAMES L. 
WAREHAM, GROVER C. WRENN, 
MICHAEL J. BRAGAGNOLO, and 
HENRY H. TAYLOR, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Case No. 01-300722MI 
Honorable David S. Young 
4JHASJ 
Defendants Henry H, Taylor; John R. Grainger; James R. Bullock; Leslie W. Haworth; 
John W. Rollins, Sr.; John W. Rollins, Jr.; David E. Thomas, Jr.; Henry B. Tippie; James L. 
Wareham; Grover C. Wrenn and Michael J. Bragagnolo's Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction came on for regularly scheduled hearing on 
Monday, May 13,2002, at approximately 2:00 p jn. Counsel for the plaintiff and for the moving 
defendants made their appearances on the record, Based upon the memoranda of law, oral 
argument of counsel, and for good cause shown. 
i f IS HEREBY ORDERED that all of the defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
Complaint for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction are hereby granted, and Plaintiffs' Complaint is 
hereby dismissed as to these defendants without prejudice to re-filing in an appropriate forum, 
hut with prejudice to re-filing in Utah. 
DATED this 4 2 w ^ f e l f e " 
L/ BY THE COURT 
Honorable 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO-FORM 
icext visiter 
Abbott & Walker 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, UT 84564 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
inusj. 2 
J. 
Suitter Axland 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1380 
Attorneys for Defendant Michael Braganolo 
A£drew-CrTDeiss 
Williams & Hunt 
275 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Attorneys for Defendants James K Bullock, John 
R. Grainger and Leslie W, Haworth 
E. Barney Gesas 
Clyde, Snow, Sessions Ai'Swenson, P.C 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2216 
Attorneys for Defendants David E. Thomas, Jr., 
John W. Rollins, Jr., John W. Rollins, Sr.> 
James L. Waxeharn, Grover C. Wrenn^ and 
Henry B. Tippie 
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Scott Walker 
ABBOTT & WALKER 
3651 North, 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, UT 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-1112 
Richard M. Heimaim (of counsel) 
LtEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNSTErN, LLP 
Embarcadera Center West 
275 Battery Street, 30th Floor 
San Francisco, California 94111 -3999 -Ti - ^ 
Telephone: {415)956-1000 \j^^-
Thomas M. Sobol (of counsel) ^A 
LIEFF, CABRASER, HEIMANN & BERNS"U3lN, LLP 
214 Union Wharf 
Boston, MA 02109-1216 
Telephone: (617) 720-5000 
: I' ty 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT, COUNTY OF TOOELE 
STATE OF UTAH ^ - ^ 
MPS SERIES TRUST HI (on behalf of MFS 
MUNICIPAL HIGH INCOME FUND), 
MERRILL LYNCH HIGH YIELD 
MUNICIPAL BOND FUND, INC., 
MUNIHOLD1NGS FUND, INC., MERRILL 
LYNCH MUNICIPAL BONDFUND, THE 
NATIONAL PORTFOLIO, MERRILL 
LYNCH MUNICIPAL STRATEGY FUND, 
EATON VANCE DISTRIBUTORS, INC , T 
ROWE PRICE ASSOCIATES, INC, JOHN 
HANCOCK FUNDS, INC, and PUTNAM 
INVESTMENTS, INC. 
Plaintiffs, 
KENNfcTH W WINGER, JOHN R 
GRAINGER, JAMES R. BULLOCK, 
PAUL R. HUMPHREYS, JOHN W 
ROLLINS, SR . JOHN W ROLLINS, JR., 
LESLIE W HAWORTH, DAVID B 
THOMAS, JR., HENRY B TIPPTR, JAMF.S 
L WAREHAM, GROVER C WRENN, 
MICHAEL J BRAGAGNOLO, and HENRY 
R TAYLOR, 
Case No. 
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF 
THE UTAH SECURITIES ACT AND 
FOR COMMON LAW FRAUD AND 
NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION, 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAJ, 
Defendants 
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Plaintiffs make ihc following allegations on information and belief, based upon the 
investigation by their counsel which has included review and analysis of public statements, 
publicly-filed documents, press release and news articles, analysts' statements, relevant 
accounting rules and related literature, and other investigations except for those allegations that 
pertain to the Plaintiffs7 personal circumstances, such allegations being made on their personal 
knowledge: 
NATURE OF THIS ACTION 
1. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves as purchasers OT acquirers 
of certain bonds issued by Tooele County ("the County") on July 1, 1997, secured by a loan 
agreement for which Laidlaw Environmental Services. Inc. ("LES") and its successor Safety-Kleen 
Corp. ("Safety-Kleen" or the "Company") was the primary obligor, and retained through March 6, 
2000 (<vthc relevant time period") in reliance upon LES' and the Company's materially false and 
misleading financial statements. These bonds were entitled Pollution Control Refunding Revenue 
Bonds, due July 1, 2007 (the "Bonds"). This action alleges that Defendants made written or oral 
communications containing materi.nl false statements or omissions about LES' and Safety-Klecn's 
business, finances, and future prospects in connection with the offer for sale of those Bonds, and 
that Plaintiffs bought and retained the Bonds in reliance on said statements and were injured 
thereby. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
2. This Court has jurisdiction, under U.C.A. 1953 s. 78-27-24, over the claims 
asserted herein under the Utah Securities Act, U.C.A. 1953 s. 61-1-1 el. seq., which have been 
brought to recover damages that Plaintiffs have sustained as a result of Defendants' willful 
participation in activities violative of section 61-1-1(2) of that Act. The court similarly has 
jurisdiction over common law claims arising out of the same facts under U.C.A. 1953 s. 78-27-24 
3. Venue as to these claims is proper pursuant to U.C.A. 1953 s. 78-13-7, 
whereby the Parties to die indenture of (rust securing the Bonds contracted for the performance of 
OO:KY SAF - 2 -
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1 the indentures in Toole County, and contracted thaL ihib county was the a vail able, for a wherein 
2 causes of action relating to these Bonds should be filed. 
3 THE PARTIES 
4 4. Plaintiff MFS Scnes Trust III is a Massachusetts business trust, of which 
5 MFS Municipal High Income Fund is a series Massachusetts Financial Services Company, with 
6 principal offices at 500 Boylston St., Boston, MA 02116, is the investment advisor to MFS 
7 Municipal High Income Fund. 
g 5. Merrill Lynch High Yield Municipal Bond Fund, Inc., MuniHoIdings Fund, 
9 Inc., Merrill lynch Munipal Bond Fund, The National Portfolio, and Merrill Lynch Municipal 
10 Strategy Fund are funds incorporated in Maryland and managed by Merrill Lynch Investment 
I I Managers, L.P., with principal offices at 800 Scuddcrs Mill Roarl, Plainsbcro, N.f 08536. 
12 6. Eaton Vance Distributors, inc. is an institutional purchaser of the Bonds, and 
13 is an investment management company incorporated in Massachusetts, with principal offices at 24 
14 Federal Street, Boston, MA 02110. 
15 7. T Rowe Price Associates, Inc. is an institutional purchaser of the Bonds, and 
T6 is a Maryland corporation with principal offices at 100 East Pratt Street, Baltimore, MD 21202 
17 8. John Hancock Funds, Inc. is an institutional purchaser of the Bonds, and is a 
1 8 Delaware corporation with officer at 101 Huntington Avenue, Boston, MA 02199. 
19 9 Puhiam Investments, Inc. is an institutional purchaser of the Bonds, and is a 
20 Massachusetts corporation with offices at 1 Post Office Square, Boston, MA 02109. 
21 10. Safety-Kleen Corp., a non-defendant in this action, is a Delaware corporation 
22 having its principal executive offices at 1301 Gervais Street, Suite 300, Columbia, SC 29201. 
23 Safety-Kleen provides industrial waste services designed to collect, process, recycle and dispose of 
24 hazardous and industrial waste streams The Company provides these services from approximately 
25 230 collection 'and practising locations in 45 states and seven Canadian provinces. On June 9, 
26 2000, Safety-KLleen filed a chapter 11 petition under the United States Bankruptcy Code in the 
27 Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware and thus is a non-defendant in this action at this time 
28 
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11. The current Safeiy-Kksm wa^ formed when LES acquiied Jill of the 
outstanding capital stock of the former Safety-Kleen Corporation ("Old Safety Kleen") in a tender 
offer and subsequent merger completed in May 199$ (the "Merger"). As part of the Merger, the 
entire Board of Old Safety KLleen was replaced by directors of LES, including Defendants Bullock 
and Winger, who assumed management control over the Company. LES subsequently announced 
on June 22, 1998 that effective July 1, 1998 it would begin doing business as Safety-Kleen under 
the NYSE ticker symbol USK". On November 25, 1998, LES officially changed its name to 
Safety-Kleen Corporation. 
12. Laidlaw Inc ("Laidlaw"), a non-defendant m this action, is an Ontario, 
Canada corporation, wid^ 87 subsidiary or affiliate corporations in the State of Delaware, which 
owns approximately 44% of Safety-Kleen common stock. On May 15, 1997, Laidlaw merged its 
hazardous waste services business into Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. ("Rollins"), wbich was 
renamed LES. The consideration received in this transaction consisted of: (i) $400 million in cash 
and assumption of debt, (ii) 120 million common sixares of LES, and (iii) a 5350 million 12 year 5% 
ConvertibleDcbenture, resulting in a 67 percent ownership of LES by Laidlaw prior to the Merger 
which created Safety-Kleen Corp. On June 28,2001, Laidlaw filed a chapter 11 petition under the 
United States Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York, and 
thus is a non-defendant in this action at this time. 
13. Defendant Kenneth W. Winger ("Winger") served as President, Chief 
Executive Officer and a Director of Safety-Kleen since the Merger, and held the same positions at 
LES from May 1997 until the Merger Winger served as a Director of Safety-Kleen until the Board 
placed him on administrative leave on or about March 6, 2000, and he served as CEO until he 
resigned on or about May 12, 2000. As of October 18, 1999, Winger beneficially owned 42,326 
shares of the Company's common stock. 
14. Defendant Pau] R. Humphreys ("Humphreys") was the Company's Senior 
Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer since the Merger. Prior lo the Merger, 
Humphreys held senior executive positions at LES. Humphreys served as a Director of Safety-
Kleen until the Board placed him on administrative leave on or about March 6, 2000, and he served 
Complaint 
1 as CFO until he resigned on or about May 12, 2000. As of October 18, 1999, Humphreys 
2 beneficially owned 9,000 shares of the Company's common stock. 
3 15. Defendant Michael J. Bragagnolo ("Bragagnolo") served at all relevant times 
4 as a Director, Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Safely-Kleen. Prior to the 
5 Merger, Bragagnolo held senior executive positions with LES. Bragagnolo served as a Director of 
6 Safety-KIccn until the Board placed him on administrative leave on or about March 6, 2000, and he 
7 served as COO until he resigned on or about May 12, 2000. 
g 16. Defendant James R. Bullock ("Bullock") was the Chairman of the Board and 
9 a Director of Safety-KJcen since the Merger, until he resigned from those positions on or about 
10 January 25, 2000. Bullock was also Chairman of the Board of Directors of LES from 1997, through 
11 the Merger, and is currently a Director and an executive officer of Laidlaw Inc. (lsLaidlaw") 
12 17. Defendant John R. Grainger ("Grainger") served as a Director of LES since 
13 1997, when he was also President, Chief Executive Officer, and a director of Laidlaw at all relevant 
14 times. 
15 18. Defendant John W. Rollins, Sr. ("Rollins, Sr.") served at all relevant times as 
1 6 a Director of Safety-Kleen and LES until he died on April 4, 2000. 
17 19. Defendant Leslie W. Haworth ("Haworth1') served as a Director of LES since 
18 May 1997 and later of Safety-Kleen. He also served as an executive officer of Laidlaw. Haworth 
19 served as the Chairman of the Audit Committee of the Board of Safety-Kleen until March 23, 1999. 
20 20. Defendant John W. Rollins, Jr. ("Rollins, Jr.") served at all relevant times as 
21 a Director of Safety-Kleen and LES. Rollins, Jr. is a member ofthe Human Resources and 
22 Compensation Committee ofthe Board of Safety-Kleen. 
23 21 Defendant David B. Thomas, Jr ("Thomas") served as a Director of 
24 Safety-Kleen and LES since June 1997 Thomas is a member ofthe Human Resources and 
25 Compensation Committee ofthe Bojrd of Safety-Kleen. 
26 22. Defendant Henry B. Tippie ('Tipple") served as a Director of Safety-Kleen 
27 and LES since 1997. Tippie is the Chairman ofthe Audit Committee ofthe Board of Safeiy-Klecn. 
28 
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1 23. Defendant James L. Warcham ("Wareham") served at all relevant times as a 
2 Director of Safeiy-Kleen and LES since June 1997. Warehain is a member of thes Audit Committee 
3 of the Board of Safety-Kleen. 
4 24. Defendant Grover C. Wrcnn OkWrenn,r) served al all relevant rimes as a 
5 Director of Safety-Kleen, and as a Director of LES since July 1997. Wren is a member of the Audit 
6 Committee o^ the Board of Safety-Kicen. 
7 25. Defendant Henry H. Taylor ("Taylor31) served at all relevant times as a 
8 Director, Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of Safety-Kleen, and as a Director of LES 
y since May 1997. 
10 26. The Defendants listed in paragraphs 13 through 25 are referred to collectively 
1) herein as the "Individual Defendants/' 
12 27. Each Defendant had the opportunity to commit and participate in the 
13 misconduct alleged. The Individual Defendants were among the top officers of Safety-Kleen-who 
14 controlled us press releases, corporate reports, United States Securities and Exchange Commission 
15 ("SbC") filings, and its communications with analysts. Thus, they were among those who 
16 controlled the public dissemination of, and could falsify, the information about Safety-Kleen's 
17 business, products, financial results, and fumre prospects that reached the Plaintiffs and affected the 
1 8 price of (he Bonds complained of herein. 
19 SUBSTANTIVE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
20 Background: The Acquisitions forming Safefv-Kleen 
21 28. In May, 1997, Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. ("Rollins"), the largest 
22 commercial hazardous waste incineration company in North America, acquired Laidlaw Inc. 's 
23 hazardous and industrial waste operations (the "Rollins Acquisition"). Upon consummation of the 
24 Rolhns Acquisition, whje-h was accounted for as a reverse acquisition, Rollins changed its name to 
25 Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc. to finance the Rollins Acquisition, LES: (i) issued 
26 120 million shares of LES Common Stock, (ii) issued a $350.0 million 5% subordinated convertible 
27 pay-in-kind debenture (the PIK Subordinated Debenture") and (iii) paid S349.1 million in cash to 
28 Laidlaw Inc. ("Laidtaw,,)t 
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1 29. In April 1998, LES acquired by means of a tender offer approximately 94% 
2 I of the common slock of the Old Safety Kleen, to be followed by a short-form merger in which the 
3 remaining outstanding shares of the former Safety-Klccn Corporation would he acquired by LES 
4 (together the "Safety-Klccn Acquisition"). 
5 30. In May, 1998, LES consummated the Safety-Kleen Acquisition. The 
6 I aggregate consideration of the Safcty-Kleen Acquisition was approximately S1.1 billion in cash and 
7 | (lie issuance of approximately 168 million shares of Common Stock of LES, 
8 J 31. Pursuant to the Merger Agreement, Laidlaw was entitled to designate to the 
9 I Safety-Klccn Board the number of directors as would make the percentage of directors designated 
10 1 by Laidlaw approximately equal to the aggregate voting power of the Safety-Kleen shares held by 
11 I Laidlaw. Accordingly, following the merger, seven former directors of Old Safety Kleen resigned 
12 from their positions on the Board and Laidlaw designated as replacements Winger, Bullock, Rollins, 
13 Thomas, Wareham, Wrenn and Haworth, and these designees were all elected as directors of the 
14 I Company. 
15 1 LES' and Safetv-Kleen's Fraudulent Accounting Practices 
j 6 I 32. On March 6, 2000, Safeiy-Kleen announced that it had uncovered material 
17 | "accounting irregularities" in its financial reports, leading it to place its three top-executives — 
18 Defendants Kenneth W. Winger ("Winger"), Michael Bragagnolo ("Bragagnolo^) and Paul R. 
19 Humphreys ('"Humphreys") -- - on leave while a Special Committee appointed by Safety-Kleen's 
20 Board of Directors ("the Board") investigated the extent to which the Company would need to 
21 restate its financial reports dating back at least to the end of fiscal year 1998. Winger, Bragagnolo 
22 I and Humphreys all subsequently resigned as officers and directors of the Company. 
23 I 33. In its March 6, 2000 announcement, the Company admitted that its 
24 1 previously reported financial results from as early as the end of 1997 had been materially misstated. 
25 | hidced, the next day, PncewaterhouseCoopcrs LLP, the Company's accountant tcorally advised 
26 J [Safety-Kleen] thai it was withdrawing its previously issued reports on the financial statements of 
27 the registrant for the years ended August 31, 1999, 1998 and 1997." These opinions had stated that 
28 Safety-Kleen's financial statements for fiscal years 1997, 1998, and 1999 had be$m prepared in 
Complaint _ 
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conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). As such, the financial 
statements published by the Company and upon which Plaintiffs relied in purchasing the bonds 
were withdrawn by the Company's accountants. In response, the value of the Bonds which 
Plaintiffs purchased plunged dramatically* 
34. TndeedT ihe Company's financial statements for the fiscal ysars 1997, 1998, 
and 1999, as well as the first quarter of fiscal 2000, had improperly recognized revenue in violation 
of the Company's own revenue recognition policy and GAAP. 
35. GAAP are those principles recognized by die accounting profession as the 
conventions, rules and procedures necessary to define accepted accounting practice at a particular 
time. Regulation S-X (17 C.F.R. §210.4-01(a)(1)) states that financial statements filed with the SEC 
which are not prepared in accordance with GAAP are presumed to be misleading and inaccurate. 
Regulation S-X also requires that interim financial statements comply with GAAP 17 C.F.R. § 
210.10-01 (a). 
36. Beginning in 1997 or earlier, the defendants caused LES to artificially inflate 
us reported revenue and income by a wide variety of fraudulent practices. Tn each case3 LES and 
later Safcty-Kleen reported revenue and income in a manner not in conformity with GAAP, 
Following arc some of the particular fraudulent practices that defendants employed: 
A Liability Reserves 
37. Both LES' and Safety-KIeen's landfills were divided into "cells," with each 
cell capable of handling a particular volume of waste. Old Safety-Kleen, LES, and other 
predecessors of LES were required under GAAP to provided reserves to cover £he environmental 
costs of closing each cell, The amount of the reserves for closing costs that Old Safety-Kleen 
provided for each cell was based in part on the total upfront construction cost of a cell. Old 
Saicty-Kleen's engineering department and fixed assets department calculated this figure. Through 
the life of the cell, Old Safcty-Kleen were required to amortize the closing costs and expense the 
amount of amortization, reducing the Company's reserves by the same amount. 
38. Beginning in 1997 or earlier, without any factual justification, LES reduced 
the amount of its own environmental reserves to levels below that Company's actual probable 
002 NY SAh - 8 -
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environmental liabilities. The amounts of these reductions were added to LES' reported income. 
Following the Merger, Safety-Kleen's environmental reserves were reduced to levels below the new 
Company's actual probable environmental liabilities and the amounts of the fraudulent reductions 
were included m Safety-Kleen's reported income, which was overstated by those amounts. The 
decision to reverse the reserves was made by Safery-Kleen's CFO, defendant Winger. 
B. Extended Amortization 
39. As part of its retrieval and clean up of oil, fluids and chemicals, Old 
Safety-Kleen hud purls cleaners and other equipment placed at customers' locations, as well as at 
the Company's own treatment centers and landfills. Companies in the waste management business 
are required to depreciate the cost of its equipment over their actual useful lives, as required by 
GAAP 
40. During the relevant rime period, the "useful lives" used to calculate 
depreciation of existing customer premises equipment were lengthened from five to twenty years, 
which grossly exceeded the actual economic lives of the equipment, with the purpose and effect of 
artificially increasing reported earnings, by decreasing reported expenses. 
C. Two Kinds of Double Billing 
41. One of Safety-Klcen's basic services is the retrieval and either recycling or 
deslniclion of oil, fluids and chemical. Typically the Company has a driver from one of its branches 
retrieve waste material and deliver it to a division facility for a few days (generally less than 10). 
The branch then sent the waste to a recycling planL, a landfill or an incinerator. 
42. Safety-Kleen (and Old Safeiy-Kleen before it) billed its customers for oil, 
fluids and chemicals that the Company cleans up and retrieves for recycling. Bills were sent to the 
customers by the branch that handles the service contract. The recycling plant, landfill or incinerator 
would bill the division that retrieved the waste for its costs. These costs were deducted from the 
Branch OperatiQg Allowance -- an account used to pay intercompany billing. In some instances, the 
amount of both bills were fraudulently included in Safety-Kleen* s reported revenue and income, 
even though one of them was simply an intercompany account which would not result in any actual 
income to the consolidated company. 
- 9 -002NYSAT 
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43. Safety-Kleen also introduced a simpler form of double billing in fiscal 1998. 
It simply mailed bills to its customers twice, and accounted for both bills as income. Many 
customers complained, and in some individual cases the Company made accounting adjustments, 
but the Company continued this practice through the end of the relevant time period. 
44 Since customers would pay only once, the effect of both kinds of double 
billing was to inflate Safety-Kleen1 s accounts receivables and assets as well as its reported revenue. 
45. Beginning in late 1$98 and continuing in 1999, four senior vice presidents in 
charge of Safety-Kleen's regional sales and operations in the United States reported these problems 
to defendant Bragagnolo at monthly conference calls, usually held around the tenth of the month. 
The Senior Vice Presidents also discussed these problems with defendants Winger and Humphreys, 
who joined many of the monthly conference calls. Those defendants responded to the mounting 
reports by dismissing them as "isolated incidents/' 
D. The Systems Conversion 
46. Beginning immediately after the Merger, JLES accounting systems were 
found not to be equipped to handle Safety-Kleen transactions. Moreover, after the Merger, the 
insider Defendants terminated Old Safety-Kleen's experienced accounting personnel. As a result, 
during the Summer of 1998, Safety-Kleen missed meeting its weekly payroll four times because it 
could not process the paychecks. Even chough the Company failed to make its payroll as a result of 
personnel firings and systems conversions, the Insider Defendants pressed on with their conversion 
of Old Safety-Kicen's accounting systems. 
47. Old Safety-Kleen's principal accounting system was the BAP (Branch 
Automated Processing) computer system. BAP had been designed solely for Old Safety-Kleen, and 
by the time of the Merger, Old Safety-Kleen was m a second generation of BAP - known as "Daddy 
BAPM by Company personnel The BAP had Company pricing and revenue information contained 
in the system On a daily basis, Old Safety-Kleen branch personnel would enter each day's work 
onto the BAP from service representatives control sheets with tickets foi customer services. That 
information was then downloaded to the accounting department. 
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1 48. After the Merger, the Insider Defendants forced Old Safcty-Kleeii to convert 
2 its accounting systems (most importantly the BAP), which handled 500,000 customers and 5 million 
3 transactions per year, to LES* accounting system (PeopieSofl), which had only b«en used for 15,000 
4 customers and 150,000 transactions per year The L£S system, however, was not equipped to 
5 handle the increase of millions of transactions, 
6 49. Indeed, during and after the PeopleSoft conversion, Safety-Kleen had a 
7 materially significant problem with accounts receivable because the new system could not tell 
8 which customers had paid their invoices, In one Illinois branch, there were about $2 million worth 
9 of invoices (hat had been paid but could not be reconciled to specific customers. Safety-KJeen 
10 blindly deposited the checks and kept billing its customers. When customers complained, 
11 Safety-Klccn branch personnel were directed to tell their customers as little as possible and state 
12 that it was an isolated incident, even though the branch personnel knew otherwise. 
13 B. The Internal Audit Finds Completely Fictitious Revenue Entries 
[4 50. In January, 2000, Defendant Tippie approached Greg Williamson, 
15 SafetyKleen's internal audit director, and requested an internal audit due to Tippie's concerns about 
16 the Company's reported revenues. 
17 51. Three internal auditors, Ariiss Herrara ("Herrara"), Anthony Holden 
18 ("Holden")* &nd Alan Townsend ("Townsend1'), reviewed the Company's revenues from August 
19 1999 through February 2000 and determined that mey were overstated. They further reviewed the 
20 Company's revenues and discovered that revenues, for fiscal years 1997 through 1999 were also 
21 overstated. The three auditors calculated that the total overstatement ran m excess ot hundreds of 
22 millions of dollars. 
23 52. Herrara, Holden and Townsend found journal entries that were made to 
24 increase revenues, but had nothing to do with billing. They were strictly paper entries for which no 
25 money was ever exchanged. Indeed, it was Herrara, Holden and Townsend who round the phantom 
26 5500,000 to 520 million enrnes. Herrara, Holden and Townsend never found any supporting 
27 documentation for the bogus entries 
28 
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1 53. The internal audit was completed within three weeks of Tippie's request to 
2 fl Williamson Upon completing iheir work, Herrara, Holden and Townsend transmitted their results 
3 | to Williamson, who prepared a formal report that was submitted to the Audit Commirtce of the 
4 | Board of Directors. 
5 54. When word leaked that Herrara, Holden and Townsend had discovered 
6 massive overstatements of revenue, the Company's Controller, William Ridings went to the Board 
7 meeimg on March 4, 2000, announced himself as a whistleblower, and proceeded to disclose to the 
8 Board that financial fraud had occurred at Safety-Kleen, 
y 55. Within two days, defendants Winger, Humphreys, and Bragagnolo were 
10 placed on administrative leave pending the results of a larger investigation into accounting 
] 1 irregularities at Safety-Kleen. 
12 56. On March 7, 2000, the Company announced that PWC "was withdrawing its 
13 previously issued reports on the financial statements of Safety-Kleen for the years ended August 31, 
14 1999, 1998 and 1997" and publicly aimounced that those financial statements would be restated. 
15 57. By definition (see Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20), a 
16 restatement of financial statements means that those financial statements when issued were 
II ' 
17 materially false. 
lg 58. By announcing the future restatement of its financial statements, 
19 Safery-Klecn (previously LES) has admitted that the representations made in the financial 
20 statements for fiscal years ended August 31, 1997, 1998, and 1999, as well as the first quarter of 
21 fiscal 2000, were materially false and misleading when made. APB No 20 ] 13. 
22 59 The Offering Memorandum accompanying the Bonds purchased by Plaintiffs 
23 in the Utah issuances dated Jnly 1997 incorporated, inter alia, directly or by rQfer^nce: Laidlaw, 
24 Inc.'s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the first quarter ended November 30, 1996, Laidlaw, 
25 lnc 's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for Lhc second quarter ended February 28, 1997; LES1 
26 Reports on Form 8-K dated May 30, 1997 and June 11, Pro Forma Condensed Combined Summary 
27 I Financial Data for Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. and Laidlaw Subsidiaries (including LES) 
2R for the six months ended February 28, 1997; Pro Forma Combined Financial Statements and 
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1 Statement of Operations fur Rollins Environmental Services, Inc. and Laidlaw Subsidiaries for the 
2 six months ended February 28, 1997; Laidlaw Hazardous Waste Services Management's Discussion 
3 and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations for the six months ended February 
4 28, 1997, Laidlaw Hazardous Waste Services Combined Statements of Income for the six months 
5 ended February 28, 1997, and Laidlaw Hazardous Waste Services Combined Statements of Cash 
6 Flows for the six months ended February 28, 1997. Laidlaw, Tnc.'s Quarterly Reports incorporated 
7 financial statements from its subsidiaries, including LES. 
g 60. The financial statements described in the preceding paragraph, delivered to 
9 the Plaintiff purchasers in the Offering Memorandum comprise a portion of those financial 
10 statements that the Company has since withdrawn. As a result of Defendants' inclusion ot these 
L1 financial statements, the Offering Memorandum contained materially false and misleading 
12 statements in violation of section 61-1-22 of the Utah Securities Act. 
13 61. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") has commenced its own 
14 investigation of the Company's financial statements and reporting. 
15 62. Safety-Kleen announced that it had initiated a forensic audit oTits flnancials 
16 and that the release of its quarterly financial results would be delayed pending further review by the 
17 forensic auditors. 
] g 63. On or about May 30, 2000, Safety-Kleen missed debt payrnemts totaling 
19 $59.8 million 
20 64. On June 9, 2000, the Company filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of Lhe 
21 Bankruptcy Code in the U-S Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. 
22 65. The Bonds remain in default, and liquidity has all but dried up. 
23 66. While the Company has not as yet disclosed how its financial statements are 
24 materially false or the precise amount of the restatements, the significant actions taken by the 
25 Company make clear thai Defendants acted improperly in inflating Safcty-Kleen's (previously 
26 LhS1) financial results since the beginning of fiscal year 1997 and thereby misled Plaintiffs in 
27 violation of the Utah Securities Act, section 61-1-22 
28 CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
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COUNT I 
Violation of U.C.A. § 61-1-1(2) Against Defendants Winger^ Bullock, Humphreys, Bragaguolo, 
Crainger1 Hawortfeu Rollins. Sr„ Rollins, Jr., Thomas, Tippie, Warefaamu Wrcon and Tavlor 
67, Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each allegation in paragraphs 28 through 
66 above as if fully set forth here, and further allege as follows: 
68. The sale of the Bonds was accomplished through the issuance of a 
Preliminary Offering Memorandum ("Offering Memorandum"), dated June 23, 1997. 
09. The Offering Memorandum contained untrue statements o£ material fact 
required to be stated therein and/or necessary co make the statements in the Offering Memorandum 
nol misleading, including but not limited to audited, unaudited and Pro Forma financial statements 
from 1997, and management discussions thereof. 
70. On March 7, 2000, Safety-KJeen withdrew its audited financial statements for 
) 9077 among other years, and publicly announced thai those financial statements Would be restated 
71. By definition (see Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20), a 
restatement of financial statements means that those financial statements when issued were 
materially false. 
72. Defendants Winger, Bullock, Humphreys, Haworth, Bragagnolo, Grainger, 
Haworth, Rollins, Sr
 3 Rollins, Jr., Thomas, Tippie, Wareham, Wrenn and Taylor signed and/or 
were aware of the contents of the financial statements incorporated in the Offering Memorandum. 
73. Defendants Winger, Bullock, Humphreys, Bragagnolo, Grainger, Haworth, 
Rollins, Sr., Rollins, Jr., Thomas, Tippie, "Wareham, Wrenn and Taylor were also directors and/or 
officers of LES at the time that the Offering Memorandum was issued and the Bonds sold, and 
substantively participated in the sale of those Bonds.. 
74 Pnor lo the sale of the Bonds and in the years following, Bullock, Winger, 
Bragagnolo, Humphreys, Haworth, Wareham, Tippie, Wrcmi, Grainger, Rollins, Br., Rollins, Jr, 
Thomas, and Taylor had knowledge of or reasonable giound to believe that the Company's 
Registration Statements and Prospectuses contained untrue statements of material fact and/or 
omitted material facts required to be stated therein to make the statements m the Registration 
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1 Statements and prospectuses not misleading. Each of these Defendants had knowledge of or 
2 reasonable ground to believe in the existence offacts which made the Company's Registration 
3 Statements, prospectuses and other financial statements false and misleading. 
4 75. Plaintiffs had no knowledge ofthe falsities contained in the Offering 
5 Memorandum and relied on those false statements to their detriment. 
g I 76 As a result ofthe Defendants7 conduct, Plainiiffe suffered damages, 
7 COUNT II 
8 Violation of U.C.A. §§61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22(4) Against Bullock, Winger, Bragagnolo, 
Humpiireys^Haworth, Wareham, Tippic, Wrenn, Grainger, Rollins, Sr.7 Rollins, Jr., Thomas^ 
9 and Taylor 
I o 77. Plamti fls repeat and allege each and every allegation contained above as if 
II fully seL forth herein. 
12 78. This Count is brought pursuant to Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-22(4) ofthe 
13 Utah Securities Act on behalf of the Plaintiffs against Defendants Bullock, Wingpr, Bragagnolo, 
14 Humphreys, Haworth, Wareham, Tippie, Wrenn, Grainger, Rollins, St\, Rollins, Jr., Thomas, and 
15 Taylor. 
16 79. Although LES and Safety-Kleen are not parties, nor arc Plaintiffs asserting 
17 claims against LES or Safety-Kleen in this action, LES (later Safety-Kleen) committed a primary 
18 violation of Section 61-1 -1(2) of the Corporations Code, by selling the Bonds by means of false 
19 statements as incorporated in the Offering Memorandum (as described herein). 
20 80. Defendants Bullock, Winger, Bragagnolo, Humphreys, Haworih, Wareham, 
21 Tippie, Wrenn, Grainger, Rollins, Sn, Rollins, Jr., lhomas, and Taylor, and non-defendant Laidl&w, 
22 controlled LES (later Safety-Kleen) within the meaning of Section 61-1-22(4) ofthe Utah Securities 
23 Act Winger, Humphreys, Bragagnolo, and Taylor were each a Director and an executive officer of 
24 Safety-Kleen, previously LES, Grainger, Bullock and Haworth were each a Director and an 
25 executive officer of non-defendant Laidlaw, Rollins, Sr., Rollins, Jr , and Thomas each served as 
26 Directors of LES during the relevant time period and then Safety-Kleen; and Tippie, Wareham, and 
27 Wrenn are each directors of Safety-Kleen (and formerly of LES) who served on the Audit 
28 I Committee of the Board during the relevant time penod. By virtue of their high level positions with 
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1 the Company, their participation on the Audit Committee, and their participation and/or awareness 
2 of the Company's operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false financial statements filed by 
3 the Company with the SEC and disseminated to Plaintiffs, these Defendants had she power to 
4 influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly; the decision-making 
5 process of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the financial statements and 
6 public filings which Plaintiffs contend are false and misleading. These Defendants were provided 
7 with, or had unlimited access to, copies of the Company's reports, press releases, public filings, 
8 financial statements and other statements alleged by Plaintiffs to be false and misleading prior to 
9 and/or shortly after these statements were issued or publicly disseminated and had the ability to 
10 prevent their issuance or public dissemination or cause the statements to be corrected. 
11 81 Defendants Winger, Bullock, Bragagnolo and Humphreys, as the senior 
12 officers of Safety-Kleen (and its predecessor LES) were personally responsible for the financial anc 
13 Registration Statements incorporated by the Offering Memorandum, along with the Company's 
14 Forms 10-Q, 8-K, 10-K. and other SEC tilings and press releases during die relevant time period. 
15 82. Laidlaw was, and is, the controlling shareholder of Safety-KLleen and 
1 6 exercised control through its designees to die Board and its 44% stockholding in the Company. 
17 83. LES, the primary obligor of the Bonds issued by Tooele County, was a 
18 wholly owned subsidiary of Laidlaw, Laidlaw was later die controlling stockholder of 
19 Safety-Kleen, Laidlaw thus controlled LES (latex Safety-Kieen) at the time LES made materially 
20 false and misleading statements in their public filings and m the Offering Memorandum, 
21 84. Prior to the sale of the Bonds and in the years following, Bullock, Winger, 
22 Bragagnolo, Humphreys, Haworth, Wareham, Tippie, Wrenn, Grainger, Rollins, Sr., Rollins, Jr , 
23 Thomas, and Taylor had knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe that the Company's 
24 Registration Statements and Prospectuses contained untrue statements of material fact and/or 
25 omitted material facts required to be stated therein to make the statements in the Registration 
26 Statements and prospectuses not misleading. Each of these Defendants had knowledge of or 
27 reasonable ground to believe hi the existence of facts which made the Company's Registration 
28 Statements, prospectuses and other financial statements false and misleading-
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1 85. The materially false and misleading statements by these Defendants, along 
2 with Safety-Kleen (and LES) as alleged herein, were made in connection with the purchases of the 
3 Bonds by Plaintiffs. 
4 86. At the time Plaintiffs purchased the Bonds, they did not know of any of the 
5 false and/or misleading statements and omissions, and relied upon the representations made by LE£ 
6 I (later Safely-KJccn) and the Defendants. 
7 87. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of these Defendant 
8 Plaintiffs suffered damages. 
9 | 88, By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, Bullock, Winger, 
10 Humphreys, Bragagnolo, Haworth, Tippie, Wareham, Wrenn, Grainger, Rollins, Sr., Rollins, Jr., 
11 Thomas, and Tayior are liable pursuant to Section 61-1-22(4) of the Utah Securities Act. 
12 COUNT 111 
13 For Fraud Against Defendants Winger, BuHock, Humphreys^ and Bragagnolo. 
14 89. Plaintiffs repeat and allege each and every allegation contained above as if 
1 5 fully sci forth herein 
16 90. Defendants Winger, Bullock, Bragagnolo and Humphreys, as the senior 
17 officers of Safety-Kleen (and its predecessor LES) were personally responsible far the Registration 
18 Statements and prospectuses incorporaied by the Offering Memorandum accompanying the sale of 
19 the Bonds, along with the Company's Forms 10-KL and other SEC filings and press releases during 
20 the relevant time period during which the Plaintiffs retained the bunds. 
21 91. Those documents contained untrue statements of material fact and/or omittec 
22 material facts required to be stated therein to make the statements in those statements and 
23 prospectuses not misleading Specifically, the Safety-Kleen (and its predecessor LES) 1997, 1998 
24 and 1999 audited financial statements have been withdrawn and will be restated, which is an 
25 1 admission thai they were false when Lssucd (sec Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20) 
26 92. Each of Defendants Winger, Bullock, Humphreys and Bragagnolo were a 
27 1 Director and an executive officer of Safety-Kleen who had the power to influence and control and 
28 I did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making process of the Company, 
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1 including the content and dissemination of the financial statements and public filings which 
2 Plaintiffs contend are false and misleading. These Defendants were provided with or had unlimited 
3 access to copies of the Company's reports, press releases, public filings, financial statements and 
4 other statements alleged by Plaintiffs to be false and misleading prior to and/or shortly after these 
5 statements were issued or publicly disseminated and had the ability to prevent their issuance or 
6 public dissemination or cause the statements to be corrected. Each Defendant had knowledge of or 
7 reasonable ground to believe that the Company's Registration Statements and Prospectuses 
8 contained untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted material facts required to be stated 
9 therein to make the statements in the Registration Statements and prospectuses not misleading. 
10 Each of these Defendants had knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of facts 
11 which made the Company's Registration Statements, prospectuses and other financial statements 
12 false and misleading. 
13 93. In particular, Winger, Humphreys and Bragagnolo, as executive officers of 
14 Safety-Kleen had direct and supervisory involvement in and controlled the Company's day-to-day 
15 operations. Bullock was directly involved through his role as Chairman of the Board. 
16 94. The materially false and misleading statements by these Defendants, along 
17 with Safety-Kleen (and LES) as alleged herein, were made in connection with the purchases of the 
18 Bonds by Plaintiffs 
19 95. Plaintiffs relied on the materially false and misleading statements of the 
20 Defendants (and Safety-Kleen and LES) in purchasing the Bonds. In particular, Plaintiffs relied on 
21 the Registration Statements, Offering Memoranda, and prospectuses issued in connection with the 
22 marketing and sale of the Bonds and the financial statements contained in and made a part of those 
23 documents. Plaintiffs also relied on the public filings and press releases of Safety-Kleen and LES 
24 during the relevant time period thereafter, including Safety-Kleen*s Forms 10-K and 10-Q, in 
25 deciding to retain those Bonds. 
26 96. At the time Plaintiffs purchased the Bonds, they did not know of any of the 
27 false and/or misleading statements and omissions, and relied upon the representations made by the 
28 Defendants. 
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1 II 97 These materially false and misleading statements proximately caused 
i Plaintiffs to purchase and retain the Bonds, and thereby proximately caused Plaintiffs to suffei 
3 damages 
4 98 The Plaintiffs suffered damages both in their purchase of overvalued Bonds 
5 and by their retention of the Bonds m the face of false information, where they could have sold the 
6 Bonds, had Defendants not negligently misrepresented the Company's financial position, at a more 
7 favorable price than that which was available subsequent to March 6, 2000 
8 COUNT IV 
9 For Fraud Against Warehamu Tippie and Wrenn 
10 99 Plaintiffs repeat and allege each and every allegation contained above as if 
11 fully set forth herein 
12 100 Each of Defendants Tippie, Wareham, and Wrenn were directois of Safety-
13 Kleen and served on the Audit Committee of the Board during the relevant time period By virtue of 
14 their positions as directors and audit committee members, these Defendants had the power to 
15 influence and control and did influence and control, directly or indirectly, the decision-making 
16 process of the Company, including the content and dissemination of the financial statements and 
17 public filings which Plaintiffs contend are false and misleading 
18 101 These Defendants were provided with or had unlimited access to copies of 
19 the Company's reports, press releases, public filings, financial statements and other statements 
20 alleged by Plaintiffs to be false and misleading prior to and/or shortly after these statements were 
21 issued or publicly disseminated and had the ability to prevent their issuance or public dissemination 
22 or cause the statements to be corrected 
23 102 In particular, Tippie, Wareham and Wrenn were intimately involved with and 
24 controlled the Company s accounting and its financial reporting through their service on the Audit 
25 Committee of the Board Each of these Defendants knew facts or had access to information 
26 suggesting that Safety-Kleen's financial statements, and public statements, were false Moreover, 
27 each of these defendants, as members of the audit committee, failed to check infoimation that they 
28 had a duty to monitor 
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103. The materially false and misleading statements by these Defendants, along 
with Safety-KJeen (and LES) as alleged herein, wen: made in connection with the: purchases of the 
Bonds by Plaintiffs, 
104. Plaintiffs relied on the materially false and misleading statements of the 
Defendants (and Safety-Kieen and LES) in purchasing and retaining Bonds. In particular, Plaintiffs 
relied on the Registration Statements, Offering Memoranda, and prospectuses issued in connection 
with the marketing and sale of the Bonds and the financial statements contained in and made a part 
those documenrs. Plaintiffs also relied on the public filings and press releases of Safety-Kleen and 
LES during the relevant time, including Safety-Kleen1 s Forms 10-Kand 10-Q in deciding to 
purchase and later retain the Bonds. 
105. At the time Plaintiff purchased the Bonds, they did not know of any of the 
false and/or misleading statements and omissions, and relied upon the representations made by the 
Defendants or Safety-Kleen. 
106. These materially false and misleading statements proximately caused 
Plaintiffs to purchase and retain the Bonds and thereby proximately caused Plaintiffs to suffer 
damages. 
107. The Plaintiffs suffered damages both in their purchase of overvalued Bonds 
and by their retention of the Bonds in the face of false information,, where they could have sold the 
Bonds, hud Defendants not negligently misrepresented the Company's financial position, at a more 
favorable price than that which was available subsequent to March 6, 2000. 
COUNT V 
For Negligent Misrepresentation Against Bullock, Winger, Bragagnolo, Humphreys 
Haworth. Warefaam, Tippie, Wrenn. Grainger, Rollins. Sr„ Rollins, Jr., Thqmas, and Taylor 
10S. Plaintiffs incorporate and reallege each allegation above as if fully set forth 
here, and further allege as follows: 
109. The Bonds were offered for sale, and sold, in July 1997 through an Offering 
Memorandum. 
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1 110, Plaintiffs acquired the Bonds in an offering which was covered by the 
2 Offering Memorandum. 
3 i l l . The Offering Memorandum contained untrue statements of material fact 
4 required to be stated therein and/or necessary to make the statements in the Offering Memorandum 
5 not misleading, including hut not limited to audited, unaudited and Pro Forma financial statements 
6 from 1997, and management discussions thereof. 
7 112. On March 7, 2000, Safety-KIeen withdrew its audited financial statements for 
8 1997, among oLher years, and publicly announced that those financial statements would be rsstaicd 
9 113. By definition (sec Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20), a 
10 restatement of financial statements means that those financial statements when issued were 
11 materially false. 
12 114. Defendants Winger, Bullock, Humphreys, Haworth, Bragagnolo, Grainger, 
13 Haworth, Rollins, Sr., Rollins, Jr.7 Thomas, Tippic, Wareham, Wrenn and Taylorsigned and/or 
14 were aware of the contents of the financial statements incorporated in the Offering Memorandum. 
15 115. Defendants Winger, Bui lock, Humphreys, Bragagnolo, Grainger, Haworth, 
16 Rollins, Sr., Rollins, Jr., Thomas, Tippic, Wareham, Wrenn and Taylor were directors and/or 
17 officers of LES at the time that the Offering Memorandum was issued and the Bonds sold. 
18 116. Prior to the sale of the Bonds and in the years following, Bullock, Winger, 
19 Brdgagnolo, Humphreys, Haworth, Wareham, Tippic, Wrenn, Grainger, Rollins, Sr., Rollins, Jr., 
20 Thomas, and Taylor had knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe that the Company's 
21 Registration Statements and Prospectuses contained untrue statements ofmateriaj fact and/or 
22 omitted material facts required to be stated therein to make the statements in the Registration 
23 | Statements and prospectuses nor misleading. Each of these Defendants had knowledge of or 
24 1 reasonable ground to believe in die existence of facts which made die Company's Registration 
25 Statements, prospectuses and other financial statements false and misleading. 
26 117. Laidlaw was, and is, the controlling shareholder of Safety-KIeen and 
27 exercised control through its designees to the Board and its 44% stockholding in the Company. 
28 
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5 
j l 118 LES, the primary obligor of the bonds issued by Tooele County, was a 
2 wholly owned subsidiary of Lmdlaw. Laidlaw was later the controlling stockholder of 
3 Safcty-Kleen. Laidlaw thus controlled LhS (later Safety-Kleen) at the time LES made materially 
4 false and misleading statements in their public filings and in the Offering Memorandum. 
119. Plaintiffs had no knowledge of the falsities contained in the Offering 
0 Memorandum and relied on those false statements to their detriment 
7 120. As a direct result of ihc Defendants* conduct, Plaintiffs suffered damages. 
g | 12 L The Plaintiffs suffered damages both in their puichase of overvalued Bonds 
9 and by their retention of the Bonds m the face of false mformation, where they could have sold the 
10 Bonds, had Defendants not negligently misrepresented the Company's financial position, at a more 
11 favorable price than that which was available subsequent to March 6, 2000. 
12 I PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
^3 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment as follows: 
14 i. Awarding Plaintiffs rescissory and/or compensatory damages and punitive 
15 damages, including treble damages pursuant to LLC A. 1953 s. 61-1-22(2), together with appropriate 
16 pre-judgment interest on the purchase-price of the Bonds at the maximum rate allowable by law; 
17 2. Awarding Plaintiffs icasonable attorneys1 fs^s and costs', and 
jg 3 Awarding such other relief as this Court may deem just and proper. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
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: 
JURY PB.MANP 
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury. 
DATED July 1,2001 ABBOTT & WALKER 
By. 
3651 North, 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, VT 84604 
Telephone. (801)373-1112 
UEFF> CABRASFJ^HEMANN 
& BERNSTEIN, LLP 
Richard M. Heimann (of counsel) 
Embarcadcro Center West 
275 Battery Street, 30th Floor 
San Fnmasc-o, California 94111-3999 
Telephone (415)956-1000 
Thomas M Sobol (of counsel) 
214 Union Wharf 
Boston, MA 02109-1216 
Telephone' (617) 720-5000 
Complaint 
ADDENDUM D 
J. Rand Hirschi (#1503) 
Mark J. Morrise (#3840) 
SUITTER AXLAND 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801)532-7300 
Attorneys for Defendant Michael J. Bragagnolo 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF TOOELE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MFS SERIES TRUST III (on behalf of MFS 
MUNICIPAL HIGH INCOME FUND), 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENNETH W. WINGER, et al., 
Defendants. 
et al., 
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT 
MICHAEL BRAGAGNOLO 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR 
LACK OF PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION 
CaseNo.:01-0300722MI 
Judge David Young 
State of Michigan ) 
) ss. 
County of llMiYMJ! ) 
Michael Bragagnolo, being first duly sworn, avers as follows: 
1. I am a defendant in the above-captioned action and have personal knowledge of 
the facts stated in this affidavit. 
2. If called as a witness, I could competently testify as to the facts stated in this 
affidavit. 
3. I am not now, nor have I ever been, a resident of the state of Utah. 
'Micfiael Bragagnolo i) ^ 
On this j day of January, 2002, personally appeared before me, Michael Bragagnolo, 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to 
on this instrument, and acknowledged he executed the same. 
c^ 
Notary Public A^^f Fo^ ^ " ^ 
Residing a l T S a ^ L C W . C - ^ c A ^ <Vs: H % \ & 1 
My commission expires: (b \2-~ ^oo^A 
KATHLEEN M FOX 
NOTARY PUBLIC - MICHIGAN 
WAYNE COUNiY 
MY COMMISSION B>F!P-3 05-12-2004 
? 
ADDENDUM E 
J. Rand Hirschi (#1503) 
Mark J. Mom'se (#3840) 
SUITTER AXLAND 
175 South West Temple, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801)532-7300 
Attorneys for Defendant Michael J. Bragagnolo 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF TOOELE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MFS SERIES TRUST III (on behalf of MFS 
MUNICIPAL HIGH INCOME FUND), et al. 
REPLY AFFIDAVIT OF 
DEFENDANT 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENNETH W. WINGER, et al., 
Defendants. 
IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
FOR LACK OF 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
CaseNo.:01-0300722MI 
Judge David Young 
State of Michigan ) 
)ss. 
County of Wayne ) 
Michael Bragagnolo, being first duly sworn, avers as follows: 
1. I am a defendant in the above-capdoned action, have read plamtifrVcompIaint, 
and have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this affidavit. 
2. If called as a witness, I could competently testify as to the facts stated in this 
affidavit. 
3. I have not worked at my job with Safety-KIeen Corp. or Laidlaw Environmental 
Services, Inc. since March 2000, when I was placed on administrative leave. I have not been 
employed by those entities for over 18 months. 
4 . I have never been a director of either Safety-KIeen or Laidlaw Environmental 
Services. 
5. In my position at Safety-KIeen and Laidlaw Environmental Services, I did not 
have any management oversight or control over the accounting department. 
6. 1 did not participate in the preparation of any of the financial statements, financial 
reports, or other financial documents alleged by plaintiffs to contain untrue statements or to omit 
material facts, nor did I participate in the preparation of the offering memorandum, registration 
statement, or other SEC reports or filings referred to by plaintiffs in their complaint. 
7. I was not responsible for any of the documents described in the preceding 
paragraph; did not sign any of those documents; and did not see any of them before they were 
made public. 
8. I did not participate in the marketing or sale of the bonds complained of in this 
action; never discussed the sale or purchase of those bonds with any potential buyer; and did not 
Tiake, authorize, or approve any representations made in connection with the sale of those bonds, 
9. I have not been to Utah for any reason since leaving Safety Kleen. 
Michael Bragagnolo 
j, 
2 
On this y ^7 day of March, 2002, personally appeared before me7 Michael Bragaenolo, 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed to 
on this instrument, and acknowledged he executed the sanie. 
[*EAL] 
Notary P u b l i c ^ . 
Residing a t , - 4 ^ 3 3 ^O / ^ * < ^ _ ^ ^ 
My commission expires: -^/s?-^ s*^ ^^zr^/ 
DONALD JAY HARRIS 
tkhiy Publ^ Wayna County, M? 
Wy Co^nmisaon Expires May 19, 2002 
3 
ADDENDUM F 
Slip Copy 
Not Officially Published 
(Cai. Rules of Court, Rules 976, 977) 
Pagel 
(Cite as: 2003 W L 1521896 (CaLApp. 3 Dist.)) 
r* 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available 
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits 
courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 
not certified for publication or ordered published, 
except as specified by rule 977(b) This opinion 
has not been certified for publication or ordered 
published for purposes of rule 977 
Court of Appeal, Third District, California 
EATON VANCE DISTRIBUTORS, INC , et al, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v 
John R GRAINGER, et al, Defendants and 
Respondents 
No. C040158. 
(Super.Ct.No. 01AS01376). 
March 25, 2003 
Richard M Hermann, Lieff, Cabraser, Hermann & 
Bernstein, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
Geoffrey Alan Goodman, Murphy Austin Adams 
Schoenfeld, Sacramento, CA, Meredith N Landy, 
Brobeck Phleger & Harrison, East Palo Alto, CA, 
Howard M Hoffman, Sacramento, CA, William 
Ross Warne, Downey Brand Seymour & Rohwer, 
Sacramento, CA, Carl E Poll Stone, McGuire & 
Benjamin, Northbrook, IL, Eric S Mattson Sidley, 
Erin E Kelly Sidley, Austin, Brown & Wood, 
Chicago, IL, for Defendants and respondents 
DAVIS, J 
*1 In this action arising from corporate 
accounting fraud, the plaintiffs appeal from an 
order that quashed service of summons on several 
nonresident corporate officers and directors (Code 
Civ Proc, ss^ 418 10, subd (a)(1), 904 1, subd 
Copr © West 2003 No < 
(a)(3)) The trial court found it lacked personal 
jurisdiction over these individuals We agree and 
affirm the order 
There are three issues (1) do the officers and 
directors have sufficient "minimum contacts" with 
California to sustain personal jurisdiction, (2) does 
Corporations Code section 25504, which equates a 
corporation's liability for securities fraud with that 
of a person who controls the corporation, provide a 
basis for personal jurisdiction, and (3) does 
Corporations Code section 25550, which provides 
for substituted service of process on the 
Commissioner of Corporations, provide a basis for 
personal jurisdiction7 We answer all three questions 
no 
BACKGROUND 
In July 1997, Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc 
(LES) guaranteed a $19 5 million bond issuance 
The bonds were issued by the California Pollution 
Control Financing Authority The bond proceeds 
allowed LES to refinance the costs of two 
hazardous waste treatment facilities in California 
At the time of the bond issuance, LES was a 
partially-owned subsidiary of Laidlaw, Inc 
(Laidlaw), a Canadian corporation In May 1998, 
LES became Safety-Kleen Corporation 
(Safety-Kleen), Safety-Kleen is a Delaware 
corporation headquartered in South Carolina, and it 
assumed LES's obligations under the guarantee 
arrangement for the bond issuance 
In March 2000, Safety-Kleen announced that it had 
discovered "accounting irregularities" m the 
LES/Safety-Kleen financial statements filed for the 
1997-1999 fiscal years The bonds became 
worthless foliowmg Safery-Kleen's announcement 
In June 2000, Safety-Kleen (and according to 
plaintiffs, Laidlaw too) filed for bankruptcy A 
month later, Safety-Kleen announced that it had 
reduced its reported earnings for the 1997-1999 
fiscal years by approximately $534 million, and had 
sustained a loss of about $833 million in the 2000 
fiscal year 
The plaintiffs are five East Coast-based 
institutional purchasers of the bonds Eaton Vance 
to Orig U S Govt Works 
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Distributors, Inc , T Rowe Price Associates, Inc , 
Delaware Investment Advisors, Putnam 
Investments, Inc , and John Hancock Funds, Inc 
The plaintiffs purchased the bonds on behalf of 
several mutual funds designed to provide tax-free 
mcome to California investors and investment 
opportunities for residents of other states 
Based on the "accounting irregularities" that 
rendered the bonds worthless, the plaintiffs sued 
Laidlaw as well as the officers and directors of LES 
at the time of the bond issuance The plaintiffs 
alleged fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
violation of fraud-based California securities laws ( 
Corp Code, §§ 25400, 25401, 25403, 25500, 25501) 
Several of the sued officers and directors, none of 
whom live m California, moved successfully to 
quash service of summons based on lack of personal 
jurisdiction These officers and directors are 
Michael Bragagnolo, Henry Taylor, James Bullock, 
John Grainger, Leslie Haworth, John Rollins, Sr 
(now deceased), John Rollins, Jr, David Thomas, 
Henry Tippie, James Wareham, and Grover Wrenn 
(The plaintiffs have not challenged the ruling on 
Wrenn s motion because he became an officer or 
director of LES shortly after the bond issuance ) 
*2 This appeal ensued from the order quashing 
service 
DISCUSSION 
1. Basic Jurisdiction and Review Principles 
California's courts may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a nonresident individual on any 
basis consistent with the federal or state 
Constitutions (Pavlovich v Super 101 Court (2002) 
29 Cal 4th 262, 268 (Pavlovich ), Vons 
Companies, Inc v Seabest Foods, Inc (1996) 14 
Cal 4th 434, 444 (Vons ), Code Civ Proc , § 410 10 
) The due process clause provides the 
constitutional focus (Vons supra 14 Cal4th at p 
444, International Shoe Co v Washington (1945) 
326 US 310, 316, 320 [90 L Ed 95]) 
The due process clause sets forth two requirements 
to establish a basis for personal jurisdiction (1) the 
Page 2 
nonresident defendant must have sufficient 
"minimum contacts" with California and (2) the 
exercise of jurisdiction over thQ defendant must be 
"reasonable" (Vons, supra, 14 Cal4th at pp 444, 
449, Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz (1985) 471 
U S 462, 471-472, 475-477 [85 L Ed 2d 528] ) 
In the minimum contacts analysis, courts have 
identified two types of personal jurisdiction general 
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction (Pavlovich, 
supra 29 Cal 4th at pp 268-269 Vons, supra 14 
Cal 4th at p 445, Serafini v Superior Court (1998) 
68 CalApp4th 70, 78, 80 (Seiafini ), Tracinda 
Corp v DaimlerChrvsler AG (D Del 2002) 197 
F Supp 2d 86, 93 (Tracinda )) General jurisdiction 
may exist if the defendant's contacts with the forum 
state are substantial, continuous and systematic ( 
Vons supra, 14 Cal 4th at p 445) Where general 
jurisdiction cannot be shown, as is true here, a court 
may assume specific jurisdiction over a defendant 
in a particular case (Goehring v Superior Court 
(1998) 62 CalApp4th 894, 904 (Goehring )) 
Specific jurisdiction exists when the defendant has 
purposefully directed his activities toward the forum 
state, and the litigation anses out of or relates to 
those activities (Pavlovich, supra 29 Cal 4th at p 
269, Tayloi-Rush \ Multitech Corp (1990) 217 
CalApp3d 103, 112 (Tavloi-Rush ), Tracinda, 
supra, 197 F Supp 2d at p 93 ) 
When a nonresident defendant moves to quash 
service of summons on jurisdictional grounds, the 
plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating that 
sufficient mmimum contacts exist between the 
defendant and the forum state to justify the exercise 
of personal jurisdiction (Vons supia, 14 Cal 4th at 
p 449, Tavloi-Rush, supra, 217 Cal App 3d at p 
112 ) If the plaintiff makes this showing, then the 
defendant must demonstrate that the exercise of 
jurisdiction would be unreasonable (Vons, supra, 
14 Cal 4th at p 449 ) When there is conflicting 
evidence, the tnal court's factual determinations are 
upheld if substantial evidence supports them (Ibid) 
If there is no conflicting evidence, the question of 
jurisdiction is one of law and the reviewing court 
engages in independent review (Ibid) 
2. Minimum Contacts 
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*3 The principle of specific jurisdiction that 
applies here is that personal jurisdiction may be 
exercised over a defendant who has caused an effect 
in the forum state by an act or omission occurring 
elsewhere (Tavloi-Rush, supra 111 CalApp4th at 
p 112) Under this principle, jurisdiction may be 
invoked only where the defendant committed the act 
or omission intending or expecting to cause effects 
m California {Pavlovich, supra, 29 Cal 4th at pp 
269-273, Goehrwg supra, 62 CalApp4th at p 
909, Serafim, supia, 68 Cal App 4th at p 81 ) 
In applying this principle to nonresident corporate 
officers and directors who allegedly have engaged 
m tortious or tortious-related corporate conduct, the 
following must be noted The mere fact that 
California has jurisdiction over the nonresident 
corporation does not mean that the state has 
jurisdiction over the corporation's nonresident 
officers and directors {Colder v Jones (1984) 465 
US 783, 790 [79 LEd2d 804] (Calder ), see 
Goehring, supra, 62 Cal App 4th at p 904) The 
requirements of personal jurisdiction must be met as 
to each defendant over whom a state court exercises 
jurisdiction, thus, each defendant's contacts with the 
forum state must be assessed individually {Calder, 
supia, 465 U S at p 790) To establish a basis for 
personal jurisdiction, the officer or director must 
have personally directed or actively participated m 
the tortious conduct, and that conduct must have 
been purposefully directed toward the forum state ( 
Seagate Technology v A J Kogyo Co (1990) 219 
Cal App 3d 696, 701-704 {Seagate ), Tavloi-Rush, 
supra, 217 Cal App 3d at pp 112-114, Serafim, 
supia, 68 Cal App 4th at pp 80-81, see Pavlovich, 
supra, 29 Cal 4th at pp 269-273 ) Doing nothing 
more than simply ratifying an action taken by the 
corporation or by another corporate officer or 
director is not enough {Seagate, supra, 219 
Cal App 3d at p 704) 
The plaintiffs presented the following evidence to 
establish minimum contacts regardmg the 
nonresident officers and directors who moved to 
quash service of summons 
The plaintiffs submitted the offering memorandum 
for the bond issuance The offering memorandum 
specified the LES corporate roles of the individual 
Copr © West 2003 No Claim 
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defendants at the time of the bond issuance 
Bragagnolo was LES's chief operating officer, 
responsible for operations, sales and marketmg 
(Bragagnolo was placed on leave, and subsequently 
resigned, following the disclosure of the 
"accounting irregularities" by LES/Safety-Kleen) 
Taylor was LES's general counsel and secretary, 
responsible for legal affairs, regulatory compliance 
and governmental relations Bullock, Grainger and 
Ha worth were LES directors, and held high 
executive positions with Laidlaw or related entities 
Rollins, Sr, Rollins, Jr, Thomas, Tippie and 
Wareham were outside directors of LES 
The plaintiffs also noted that the offering 
memorandum incorporated numerous corporate 
fmancial statements from the 1997 fiscal year that 
contained material misstatements resulting from the 
"accounting irregularities" These corporate 
financial statements, plaintiffs asserted, "were 
signed by, among others, [defendant Henry Taylor " 
*4 The plaintiffs further noted that the offermg 
memorandum identified defendants Haworth, 
Tippie and Wareham as "Audit Committee 
Members" Such members oversaw LES's " 
'financial reporting process and internal controls' " 
and considered " 'major changes and major 
questions of choice regardmg appropriate auditing 
and accountmg principles and practices to be 
followed when preparmg corporate financial 
statements'" 
Finally, the plaintiffs noted that, "[a]s the managing 
officers and directors , the defendants [moving 
to quash service] controlled, managed and operated 
LES, later Safety-Kleen, and m so doing, transacted 
business m California by virtue of, at a minimum, 
the operation of facilities in California, the directed 
offenng of the Bonds to Plaintiffs, [and] the 
continuing obligation to disclose financial 
information prepared in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles for the benefit of 
holders and beneficial holders of the Bonds " 
This evidence does not show which individual 
officers and directors personally directed or actively 
participated m the alleged tortious conduct, or 
whether they purposefully directed that conduct 
Orig U S Govt Works 
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toward California Plaintiffs state generally that the 
officers and directors collectively controlled, 
managed and operated LES and thereby directed the 
offering of the bonds to the plaintiffs From this 
evidence, one can only speculate that individual 
officers and directors personally directed or actively 
participated m the tortious conduct, this does not 
suffice to establish specific personal jurisdiction ( 
Serafini, supra, 68 Cal App 4th at p 81 ) Merely 
identifying defendants Haworth, Tippie and 
Wareham as audit committee board members (and 
listing the general functions of that committee's 
members) suffers from a similar vagueness 
The plaintiffs do get more specific regarding 
defendants Taylor and Bragagnolo As LES's 
general counsel and secretary, Taylor signed some 
of the "irregular" corporate financial statements that 
the offering memorandum incorporated 
Nevertheless, as part of the bond issuance, Taylor, 
m his general counsel and secretary capacity for 
LES, issued a required legal letter opmion that 
specifically excluded from its coverage any 
opinions or representations regarding the accuracy 
of the corporate financial statements incorporated in 
the offering memorandum As for Bragagnolo, he 
submitted a declaration statmg that he neither 
signed nor prepared the offering memorandum or 
the incorporated financial statements Bragagnolo 
also noted that he did not participate m the sale or 
marketing of the bonds, and did not make, 
authonze, or approve any repi esentations made in 
connection with the sale of the bonds 
The tnal court properly found that the plaintiffs 
failed to show that individual officers and directors 
had sufficient minimum contacts with California for 
purposes of personal jurisdiction 
3. Control Person Statute—Corporations Code 
Section 25504 
*5 At the hearing on the motions to quash (and 
continuing on appeal), the plaintiffs shifted their 
focus from a traditional minimum contacts analysis 
to an analysis based on Corporations Code section 
25504 (All further undesignated section references 
are to the Corporations Code) It was at the hearing 
on the motions to quash that plaintiffs first cited 
Page 4 
section 25504 Section 25504 equates a 
corporation's liability for securities fraud with that 
of a person who controls the corporation As we 
shall explain, while section 25504 provides a basis 
for establishing liability, it does not provide an 
independent basis for establishing personal 
jurisdiction 
Section 25504 states as relevant 
"Every person who directly or indirectly controls a 
person liable under Section 25501 , every 
principal executive officer or director of a 
corporation so liable, are also liable jointly and 
severally with and to the same extent as such 
person, unless the other person who is so liable had 
no knowledge of or reasonable grounds to believe 
in the existence of the facts by reason of which the 
liability is alleged to exist" ("Person" is defined as 
including individuals and corporations (§ 25013)) 
Section 25501 specifies the remedies for section 
25401 violations Section 25401 makes it unlawful 
for any person to offer or sell a security in 
California via false statements or omissions The 
plaintiffs have alleged sections 25401 and 25501 as 
jurisdictional bases in their complamt 
The plaintiffs argue that "the basic facts which 
form the grounds for personal jurisdiction are 
undisputed (1) securities were issued or caused to 
be issued m California by LES, (2) the securities 
were offered and sold to [the plaintiffs] by way of 
false or misleading statements, and (3) [the 
defendants moving to quash service] were directors 
and officers of LES at the time of the Issuance " 
Section 25504, plaintiffs argue, provides "a 
presumption of the knowing commission of a tort by 
the officers and directors of an entity liable for 
securities fraud" By virtue of this liability under 
section 25504, plaintiffs assert, the nonresident 
officers and directors have personally committed 
direct acts or omissions m California or acts or 
omissions that had effects m California, this 
justifies California's exercise of personal 
jurisdiction Bringing the argument full circle, the 
plaintiffs maintain this conduct satisfies the 
constitutional requirement of minimum contacts 
We disagree with the plaintiffs for two related 
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reasons Two California decisions involving state 
securities law violations, Goehnng and Taylor-
Rush, respectively illustrate these reasons 
First, the plaintiffs have impermissibly conflated 
two distinct concepts liability and jurisdiction " 
'Liability and jurisdiction are independent' " ( 
Goehnng, supra, 62 CalApp4th at pp 904-905, 
quoting Sher v Johnson (9th Cir 1990) 911 F 2d 
1357, 1365 ) Liability depends on the relationship 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants, 
jurisdiction depends only upon each defendant's 
relationship with the forum {Goehnng, supra, 62 
Cal App 4th at p 905 ) Although individual officers 
and directors may be jointly and severally liable 
under section 25504 for their corporation's 
securities fraud, jurisdiction over each defendant 
must still be established individually (See ibid) 
Thus, a California court has jurisdiction only over 
those mdividual officers and directors who have 
personally established the requisite minimum 
contacts with California (See ibid) 
*6 Goehnng applied this distinction between 
liability and jurisdiction m the analogous context of 
a lawsuit agamst a partnership and its mdividual 
partners for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and 
fraud-based state securities law violations ( 
Goehnng, supra 62 Cal App 4th at pp 900-901) 
Although recognizing that individual partners are 
jointly and severally liable for the partnership's torts 
and related conduct, Goehnng concluded that 
jurisdiction over each partner must still be 
established individually {Id at pp 904-905) As 
another court has observed, liability may not be 
used "as a substitute for personal jurisdiction", 
"[pjersonal jurisdiction has constitutional 
dimensions, and regardless of policy goals, [a 
legislature] cannot override the due process clause, 
the source of protection for non- resident 
defendants " {AT & T Co v Compagme Bruxelles 
Lambert (9th Cir 1996) 94 F 3d 586, 590-591 ) 
Second, the plaintiffs' argument violates the related 
jurisdictional principle that "[e]ach defendant's 
contacts with the forum State must be assessed 
individually " (Calder, supra, 465 US at p 790) 
The mere fact that a state has jurisdiction over a 
nonresident corporation does not mean it 
Copr © West 2003 No Claim 
necessarily has personal jurisdiction over the 
corporation's nonresident officers and directors ( 
Ibid, see Goehnng, supra, 62 Cal App 4th at p 904 
) 
The Tavloi-Rush decision illustrates this principle 
in the context of a lawsuit alleging, similar to the 
lawsuit here, liability under sections 25401 and 
25504 In Tayloi -Rush, a California plaintiff sued a 
nonresident corporation and six of its nonresident 
officers and directors for fraud, conspiracy to 
defraud, and liability under sections 25401 and 
25504 based on an alleged fraudulent purchase of 
securities m California {Taylor-Rush, supra, 111 
Cal App 3d at pp 107-108, 113) The Tayloi-Rush 
court did not find personal jurisdiction over the 
nonresident officers and directors by simply 
invoking section 25504 Instead, the court analyzed 
the extent of each officer's and director's 
participation m the challenged acts or omissions and 
how those acts or omissions related to California ( 
Id at pp 113-114) By contrast, the plaintiffs' 
approach here has been to deal with the officers and 
directors collectively rather than individually 
At its core, the plaintiffs' reading of section 25504 
simply equates the corporate positions of the 
nonresident officers and directors with minimum 
contacts on their part That is not constitutionally 
allowed As this court stated m Ruger v Superior 
Court (1981) 118 Cal App 3d 427, 433, an 
mdividual's "corporate position as officer [or, we 
add, as director] does not supply the missmg link 
for a constitutionally cognizable relationship with 
California supplying the basis for personal 
jurisdiction For personal jurisdiction to he, the 
character, quality, and nature of [that individual's] 
activity must bear a substantial relationship to the 
causes of action beyond that derived solely from his 
official position with the corporation" In short, the 
plaintiffs' jurisdictional analysis under section 25504 
improperly trumps the constitutional requirement 
of minimum contacts 
*7 Finally, the plaintiffs' reliance on certain federal 
decisions— construing the federal statute on 
securities violations and control persons—is 
misplaced (15 U S C $ 78t, McNamara v Bre-X 
Minerals Ltd (ED Tex 1999) 46 F Supp 2d 628, 
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Derensis v Coopers & Lyhrand Chartered 
Accountants (DNJ1996) 930 F Supp 1003, 
Landry v Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants 
( S D N Y 1989) 715 F Supp 98, San Mateo Counrv 
Transit District v Dearman Fitzgerald and 
Roberts, Inc (9th Cir 1992) 979 F 2d 1356) In 
each of those decisions, save one, the finding of 
personal jurisdiction was based on more than a 
showing that the defendant controlled the entity 
alleged to have violated the securities law, the lone 
exception, the San Mateo decision, has been 
described as "utterly inconsistent" with 
longstanding Supreme Court precedent on personal 
jurisdiction (In re Baan Co Securities Litigation 
(D DC 2000) 81 F Supp 2d 75, 79-82, accord, 
Tracinda, supra, 197 F Supp 2d at p 99 ) 
We conclude the plaintiffs have not established 
personal jurisdiction over the nonresident officers 
and directors based on section 25504 
4. Section 25550 
Pulling out all stops, the plaintiffs look to section 
25550 as providmg a basis for personal jurisdiction 
over the nonresident officers and directors 
Assummg for the sake of argument that plaintiffs 
can raise this issue foi the first time on appeal, they 
are wrong on the merits 
Section 25550 provides in relevant part 
"When any person, including any nonresident of 
this state, engages m conduct prohibited or made 
actionable by this law or any rule or order 
hereunder, whether or not he has filed a consent to 
service of process , and personal jurisdiction over 
him cannot otherwise be obtained m this state, that 
conduct shall be considered equivalent to his 
appomtment of the commissioner to be his 
attorney to receive service of any lawful process m 
any noncriminal suit, action, or proceeding against 
him which grows out of that conduct and which is 
brought under this law or any rule or order 
hereunder, with the same force and validity as if 
served on him personally Service may be made by 
leaving a copy of the process m the office of the 
commissioner " 
Copr ©West 2003 No 
Section 25550, as specified by its language and 
chapter headmg, is simply a service of process 
statute Under section 25550, a nonresident who 
"engages in conduct' violating California's 
secunties laws is deemed to have appointed the 
California Commissioner of Corporations to receive 
service of process on its behalf regarding that 
conduct Section 25550 does not establish a basis 
for personal jurisdiction Again, the plaintiffs have 
confused distinct concepts Tins time they have 
confused the "basis of personal jurisdiction" over a 
nonresident defendant with "acquiring personal 
jurisdiction" over that defendant These are 
different concepts "Personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant depends upon the existence 
of essentially two criteria first, a basis for 
jurisdiction must exist due to [a] defendant's 
mmimum contacts with the forum state, second, 
given that basis for jurisdiction, jurisdiction must be 
acquired by service of process in strict compliance 
with the requirements of our service statutes" ( 
Ziller Electi onics Lab GmbH \ Superior Court 
(1988) 206 CalApp3d 1222, 1229, see also In re 
Marriage of Martin (1989) 207 CalApp3d 1426, 
1431, 1433 [concludmg that an analogous service 
of process statute cannot provide a basis for 
jurisdiction, but may be used to acquire jurisdiction 
if a basis for jurisdiction exists]) 
*8 Nor may section 25550 piggyback on section 
25504 to establish personal jurisdiction here, we 
have concluded that section 25504 does not provide 
a jurisdictional basis here In the end, section 25550 
, viewed alone or with section 25504, cannot 
supplant the constitutional requirement of minimum 
contacts In light of our resolution, we deny the 
request for judicial notice submitted by defendants 
Grainger, Bullock and Ha worth and joined m by 
Bragagnolo 
DISPOSITION 
The order quashing service of summons is affirmed 
We concur SCOTLAND, P J , and RAYE, J 
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